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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF VOTING 
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 
Franita Tolson* 
Abstract: Scholars and courts have hotly debated whether the preclearance regime of the 
Voting Rights Act is constitutional under the Reconstruction Amendments. In answering this 
question, this Article is the first to consider the effect of section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on the scope of Congress’s enforcement authority. Section 2 allows Congress to 
reduce the size of a state’s delegation in the House of Representatives if the state abridges the 
right to vote in state and federal elections for any reason, “except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime.” This Article contends that section 2 influences the scope of 
congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress 
the power to enforce the amendment through appropriate legislation. Section 2—with its low 
threshold for violations (i.e., abridgment on almost any grounds) that trigger a relatively 
extreme penalty (reduced representation)—illustrates the proper means-ends fit for 
congressional legislation passed pursuant to section 5 to address voting rights violations. 
Renewed focus on section 2 also sheds light on the textual and historical links between the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, links that provide a broad basis for Congress to 
regulate state and federal elections. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Shelby County v. Holder, this Article concludes that requiring preclearance of all electoral 
changes instituted by select jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act is actually a lesser 
penalty than reduced representation under section 2, and thus is consistent with Congress’s 
broad authority to regulate voting and elections under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA or the Act) is one of the most 
important pieces of civil rights legislation ever enacted, reflecting 
Congress’s expansive authority to regulate state and federal elections 
post-Reconstruction.1 The Act is responsible for eradicating much of the 
discrimination in voting that had long relegated minorities to second-
class citizenship. In 2009, the Supreme Court declined to resolve a 
constitutional challenge to section 5 of the Act,2 which requires certain 
covered states and jurisdictions to preclear all changes to their election 
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)).   
2. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009). 
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laws with the federal government before the changes can go into effect.3 
But just four years later, in Shelby County v. Holder,4 the Court 
invalidated the VRA’s coverage formula in section 4(b), essentially 
rendering section 5 void by eliminating the mechanism through which 
coverage under the preclearance regime is determined.5 The Court held 
that the coverage formula intrudes on the Constitution’s principle of 
“equal sovereignty” by subjecting certain states to the preclearance 
requirement based on “decades old data and eradicated practices.”6 
However, in invalidating the coverage formula, the Court failed to 
address precisely why Congress had the authority to reauthorize section 
5 but not section 4(b),7 despite being vocal in 2009 that section 5 could 
impermissibly intrude on state sovereignty.8 
The Court may have avoided this question because it was playing 
politics in striking down the coverage formula but not the preclearance 
provision,9 placing the onus on a gridlocked Congress to develop a new 
trigger. Or perhaps the Court was trying to be more precise in 
identifying the provision of the VRA that was actually of constitutional 
concern.10 In reality, the doctrinal confusion in Shelby County persists 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a). 
4. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
5. Id. at 2631 (stating that the “formula is an initial prerequisite to a determination that 
exceptional conditions still exist justifying [section 5’s] ‘extraordinary departure from the traditional 
course of relations between the States and the Federal Government’” (quoting Presley v. Etowah 
Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1992))). 
6. Id. at 2624, 2627. 
7. See id. at 2627, 2631. The Court says that Congress “may draft another formula based on 
current conditions,” id. at 2631, a statement that appears to reluctantly concede the constitutionality 
of section 5, at least for the time being. But it is clear that the Court may take a different view of 
section 5’s constitutionality if faced with this issue in the future. See id. at 2625 (noting that Shelby 
County’s arguments that “the preclearance requirement, even without regard to its disparate 
coverage, is now unconstitutional . . . have a good deal of force”); id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“While the Court claims to ‘issue no holding on § 5 itself,’ its own opinion 
compellingly demonstrates that Congress has failed to justify ‘current burdens’ with a record 
demonstrating ‘current needs.’” (quoting id. at 2622, 2631 (majority opinion))).  
8. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 202–03 (2009) (avoiding the constitutional question but 
suggesting that section 5 is potentially unconstitutional on federalism grounds). Whether section 5 
actually intrudes on state sovereignty, broadly defined, is contestable. As I have argued previously, 
states retain only limited sovereignty over elections after the adoption of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. See Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint 
on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195 (2012). 
9. See Richard L. Hasen, The Chief Justice’s Long Game, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/opinion/the-chief-justices-long-game.html. 
10. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (noting the potential constitutional problems with section 
5 but invalidating section 4(b) because “[t]he provisions of § 5 only apply to those jurisdictions 
singled out by § 4”). 
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because neither the Court nor the legal scholarship has a clear sense of 
the scope of congressional authority over elections.11 This inconsistency 
in the doctrine is problematic because challenges to the constitutionality 
of preclearance as a remedy to address voting rights violations are still 
on the horizon given that there are currently lawsuits to “bail in” 
jurisdictions for preclearance using the “pocket trigger” of section 3(c) 
of the VRA.12 Instead of providing clarity on these issues, however, 
Shelby County does little to resolve the tension between Congress’s 
authority to protect voting rights and the states’ sovereignty over 
elections.13 
This tension between the states and the federal government exists 
because the states have the primary responsibility of crafting the laws 
that govern state and federal elections. The U.S. Constitution allows 
states to choose the “Times, Places and Manner” of federal elections,14 
11. Indeed, a nontrivial amount of the post-Shelby County coverage has focused on the Court’s 
argument that section 4(b) violates the equal-sovereignty principle. See, e.g., Eric Posner, John 
Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, SLATE (June 25, 2013, 1:44 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_
2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice_john_roberts_struck.html; Nina 
Totenberg, Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the Supreme Court Term, NPR (July 5, 2013, 3:35 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back-at-the-supreme-
court. Even if Congress updates the formula to address this concern about treating the sovereign 
states differently, this would not address the potential federalism problems presented by the 
preclearance regime itself. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006) (authorizing federal courts to place jurisdictions that have 
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments into preclearance); see also Adam Liptak & 
Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-clear-voting-changes-with-the-
us.html. 
13. Although they are the most controversial, sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA are not the only 
voting-rights provisions that Congress has enacted that implicate matters of state sovereignty. See, 
e.g., Kevin K. Green, A Vote Properly Cast? The Constitutionality of the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. LEGIS. 45, 82 (1996) (noting that the National Voter Registration Act 
“in some ways does impinge upon state sovereignty”); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and 
Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies after Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 728–29 
(1998) (assessing whether section 2 of the VRA is an appropriate use of congressional authority); 
Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 793 (2005) 
(discussing whether the Help America Vote Act can be amended to include a private cause of action 
against the states without violating principles of federalism). Indeed, the Supreme Court decided a 
case this term holding that the National Voter Registration Act preempts portions of Arizona’s 
voter-identification law. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 
2247, 2260 (2013). Thus, the analysis presented herein sheds light on the constitutionality of various 
federal election laws, not just section 5. 
14. The Elections Clause provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for 
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the 
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing 
Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
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which, in conjunction with the states’ power under the Tenth 
Amendment,15 amounts to a plenary authority to structure and design 
elections at every level. Nonetheless, this allocation of authority is 
premised on the assumption that the states will act in good faith. The 
Framers initially worried that unfettered state control over elections 
could lead to the Union’s destruction,16 and later, that the states would 
use their control over voter qualifications to disenfranchise large 
portions of their population for illegitimate reasons.17 
It is this latter concern that prompted the passage of the VRA after 
Congress developed an extensive evidentiary record showing that racial 
discrimination in voting was widespread in certain jurisdictions and 
impervious to case-by-case litigation.18 Preclearance under section 5 
therefore ensures that any changes to election laws within these 
jurisdictions “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying 
or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”19 Critics 
argue that section 5 infringes on state sovereignty because minority voter 
registration and turnout in jurisdictions singled out for coverage through 
the trigger of section 4(b) parallel that of noncovered jurisdictions,20 and 
the very act of preclearance requires the affected areas to submit all 
changes for federal approval, including those regulations that govern 
state elections having few, if any, federal implications.21 
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“Nothing 
can be more evident than that an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national 
government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union entirely at 
their mercy. They could at any moment annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the choice of 
persons to administer its affairs.”). 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–16 (1966). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
20. Section 4(b) of the Act imposed section 5’s preclearance regime on those jurisdictions that 
used a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1964, and had less than fifty percent 
voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. Id. § 1973b(b). In 1970, the coverage 
formula was extended to those jurisdictions that maintained a test or device as of November 1, 1968 
and had less than fifty percent turnout or registration in the 1968 presidential election. Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315. Congress later extended 
section 5 to states that discriminated against language minorities. Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401. Nine states—mostly in the deep South, along with a 
few jurisdictions scattered throughout several other states—were covered by section 5. Jurisdictions 
Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ 
crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2014). 
21. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (“States must beseech 
the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right 
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This Article argues that these criticisms cannot be squared with the 
structure of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which, when 
read together, strongly support the constitutionality of the VRA’s 
preclearance regime in its entirety.22 The Amendments, which govern 
the same subject (voting) and share a drafting history, have textual and 
historical connections that are the basis for broad federal authority to 
regulate state elections, authority that is sufficient to overcome any 
disquietude about disturbing the sovereignty that states retain.23 In 
particular, the extreme penalty in section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,24 which allows Congress to reduce a state’s delegation in 
the House of Representatives for abridging the right to vote in both state 
and federal elections for reasons not limited to race discrimination, 
influences the scope of penalties that Congress can impose pursuant to 
its enforcement authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
to enact and execute on their own . . . .”); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (expressing 
similar concerns). When I refer to regulations that affect only state elections, it does not matter if a 
state adopts the same regulation for both state and federal elections. Conceivably, preclearance of 
the regulation could be constitutional as it applies to federal elections and unconstitutional as it 
applies to state elections. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 130–31 (1970) (invalidating 
minimum-age requirement as it applies to state and local, but not federal, elections), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
22. The Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to vote as a fundamental interest, Harper v. Va. 
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); see also Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 
(2006)) (passed under the Fourteenth Amendment), and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits 
abridging the right to vote on the basis of race, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; see also Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 
1973bb-1 (2006)) (passed under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
23. My interpretive approach here is a variation of Akhil Amar’s theory of intratextualism, in 
which he compares the operative terms of a specific clause of the Constitution with other clauses 
that employ the same or similar language. Akhil Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 
791–92 (1999). Similarly, John Hart Ely looks to the broader themes in the Constitution to interpret 
specific clauses. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). This Article 
loosely adopts these techniques through its reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
See infra Part II.B.1; see also Tolson, supra note 8 (applying a variation of intratextualism to 
interpret the Elections Clause and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). 
24. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a 
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to 
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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Amendments.25 The legislative debates in 1866 over the language of 
section 2 demonstrate that Congress viewed its enforcement authority 
over voting and elections broadly, although its intent was not to 
completely displace state sovereignty in this area.26 Section 2, which 
strikes a balance between protecting the franchise and respecting state 
sovereignty, illustrates the proper means-ends fit for federal voting rights 
legislation.27 Because of concerns that states will circumvent the 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment through their authority over 
elections,28 this provision sets a very low threshold for violations to 
trigger federal action (abridgment on almost any grounds) while giving 
Congress substantial authority to impose an extreme penalty to remedy 
such violations. Therefore, lesser penalties, like the preclearance regime 
imposed on certain jurisdictions by sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA, are 
an “appropriate” means of protecting the right to vote because such 
remedies are less intrusive of state sovereignty than reduced 
representation under section 2.29 
There is no body of literature discussing section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and its effect on Congress’s enforcement authority to 
regulate elections. This absence is even more glaring in scholarly 
debates over whether the VRA is consistent with the congruence-and-
proportionality standard of City of Boerne v. Flores,30 which is the test 
that courts use to assess the constitutionality of legislation passed 
25. There is a clear textual link between sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
“Congress’ power under § 5 . . . extends . . . to ‘enforc[ing]’ the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,” which, by its terms, includes section 2. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 
(1997) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5)). However, this Article argues that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments should be read together, which means that section 2 also influences the 
scope of penalties that can be adopted pursuant to the enforcement clause of section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment. See infra Part II.B.2 (viewing the Enforcement Act of 1870 as a product of 
section 2’s influence on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). 
26. See infra Part II. 
27. See infra Part II. 
28. I refer to this as an “anti-circumvention” norm that is implicit in section 2. See infra Part I.B. 
The norm is also prominent in the Court’s case law. See infra Part III. 
29. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 109 (2013) (arguing that if section 5 of the VRA is unconstitutional then section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is also unconstitutional, as it was adopted pursuant to a mechanism that 
used selective preclearance like that imposed by the VRA by excluding southern states from 
deliberating on its terms); Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the 
Extent of the VRA’s Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 948 
(2011) (arguing that under the VRA, states retain decision-making authority over the design of 
elections, and, so long as their choices are nondiscriminatory, do not receive any substantive federal 
input). 
30. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 Instead, the legal 
scholarship and the courts have narrowly focused on the relationship 
between the substantive protections of section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the enforcement provision of section 5 in determining 
the scope of congressional authority.32 As a result, debates over whether 
the Voting Rights Act is constitutional miss the key insight that any 
interpretation of congressional authority over voting and elections 
should be assessed by reading the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
together, with renewed emphasis on section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.33 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of 
Supreme Court precedent regarding Congress’s power to enforce the 
mandates of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, highlighting the 
difficulty of applying the congruence-and-proportionality standard to 
Congress’s authority over elections. The fit that the standard requires for 
congressional legislation to address particular harms generally has been 
contextual,34 and if applied to voting rights legislation, application of the 
31. Id. at 508 (applying the congruence-and-proportionality standard to invalidate the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as it applies to the states). It is not clear, after Shelby County, if 
the congruence-and-proportionality test also applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. For discussion in 
the legal scholarship regarding the standard, see, for example, Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” 
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (2001); Luke P. 
McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and 
Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 47–48 (2006); Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent 
and Its Alternatives: Defending the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349 (2006); Gabriel J. 
Chin, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the ‘Aggregate Powers’ of Congress over Elections 
(UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 313, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132158. 
32. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Congress’s Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment 
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187 (2005); 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric 
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). 
33. Recognizing that application of the congruence-and-proportionality standard could invalidate 
the VRA, some scholars have attempted to outline an alternative basis of constitutionality for 
section 5. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions 
of the Voting Rights Act after Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 204–06 (2005) (arguing that 
congressional authority to enact section 5 could potentially derive from the Guarantee Clause); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Amend and Extend the Voting Rights 
Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2007). But in advocating for the constitutionality of preclearance, 
none of these scholars adequately account for the fact that congressional power is at its lowest ebb 
when regulating state elections and when prohibiting conduct that lacks a discriminatory purpose. 
See Tolson, supra note 8. 
34. Compare Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (upholding the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) under the congruence-and-proportionality standard because 
it involved a gender-based classification), with Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 
373–74 (2001) (invalidating portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because 
disability discrimination is assessed under rational-basis review). 
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standard has to be consistent with section 2 and the structure of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Part II illustrates that this 
structural reading of the Amendments is justified through a discussion of 
the legislative debates surrounding the adoption of section 2 and 
Congress’s enactment of the Enforcement Act of 1870, one of the 
earliest pieces of voting-rights legislation.35 Section 2’s influence on 
Congress’s enforcement authority extends beyond the penalty of reduced 
representation to imposing lesser penalties, like the Enforcement Act, 
which protected African-Americans from being disenfranchised at the 
state level through direct and indirect means.36 Part III assesses the 
constitutionality of the VRA in light of these considerations, concluding 
that, contrary to the recent decision of Shelby County, the preclearance 
regime is constitutional. 
I. CONGRUENCE, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE 
INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 2 OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
coverage formula of section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, but provided 
little guidance regarding the appropriate standard of review for assessing 
the constitutionality of voting-rights legislation under the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.37 The Court relegated its discussion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to a mere footnote with little explanation of how 
either Amendment resolves the constitutional issues present in the 
35. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, invalidated by United States v. Reese, 92 
U.S. 214, 219–22 (1875). Originally passed pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Enforcement 
Act of 1870 required that all citizens be able to vote “at any election by the people in any State,” 
making no distinction between state and federal elections. Id. at 140. Section 4 of the Act imposed a 
criminal penalty on “any person [who] by . . . unlawful means, shall hinder, delay, prevent, or 
obstruct . . . any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting 
at any election,” but it imposed this penalty without any requirement that the vote denial be based 
on race. Id. at 141. 
36. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris 
eds., 1988) (discussing the challenges faced by ex-slaves in gaining political and civil rights during 
Reconstruction). 
37. In its grant of certiorari, the Court acknowledged that the preclearance regime is based on dual 
sources of constitutional authority: 
Whether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under 
the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its 
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth 
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution. 
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 594, 594 (2012) (order granting petition for a writ of 
certiorari). 
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case.38 Instead, the Court contended that section 4(b) failed both 
rational-basis review39 and the standard of review derived from its 
decision in NAMUDNO, which “guides [its] review under both [the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth] Amendments.”40 The latter statement is the 
most perplexing given that NAMUDNO did not articulate a standard of 
review under these provisions.41 Nevertheless, the Shelby County 
Court’s obscure and vague pronouncements left a clear opening for later 
assertions that the more exacting congruence-and-proportionality test 
applies to legislation passed pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment.42 
Shelby County provides little hope that this more-restrictive test will 
not apply if litigants challenge other provisions of the VRA including 
section 3(c), section 5, or even section 2 of the Act.43 Strict application 
of the congruence-and-proportionality standard is incompatible with 
protecting voting rights under either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth 
Amendments. America’s decentralized system of elections gives states 
substantial legislative discretion to engage in acts that might otherwise 
infringe the fundamental right to vote and disadvantage racial minorities, 
complicating the means-ends analysis applied to voting rights legislation 
designed to address these harms.44 Since section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment gives Congress substantial authority to legislate in this area, 
the congruence-and-proportionality standard has to be interpreted in 
light of this provision. 
38. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 n.1 (2013). 
39. See id. at 2629–30. But see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) 
(applying this standard to assess section 5 of the VRA). 
40. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2622 n.1. 
41. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009) (“The parties do not agree on the standard to 
apply in deciding whether, in light of the foregoing concerns, Congress exceeded its Fifteenth 
Amendment enforcement power in extending the preclearance requirements . . . . That question has 
been extensively briefed in this case, but we need not resolve it. The Act’s preclearance 
requirements and its coverage formula raise serious constitutional questions under either [the 
congruent-and-proportional or rational-basis] test.”). 
42. See Richard Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future Jurisprudence of 
Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-future-jurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-
race/. 
43. Section 2 forbids any “qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure” that has 
“the purpose [or] effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color” and, 
unlike section 5, applies nationwide. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006). 
44. Karlan, supra note 33, at 10–12. 
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A. Reevaluating the Congruence and Proportionality Standard in the 
Context of Voting and Elections 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court changed its standard from the 
more permissive rational-basis review outlined in cases like South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach45 to the congruence-and-proportionality test, 
which requires that Congress establish a record of constitutional 
violations before it can legislate a remedy pursuant to section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.46 At least initially, the Court held that the VRA 
passed muster under the more-rigorous standard. Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority in City of Boerne, noted that the Act was 
“confined to those regions of the country where voting discrimination 
had been most flagrant and affected a discrete class of state laws,”47 
which ensured that it is the type of “[r]emedial legislation under 
[section] 5 . . . ‘adapted to the mischief and wrong which the 
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide against.’”48 Despite 
this language, however, the quantum of proof that Congress must amass 
to show that legislation is “appropriate” is inconsistent with more 
deferential pre-City of Boerne precedent, posing a problem for all federal 
voting-rights legislation. 
The place of disagreement between Katzenbach’s broad view of 
congressional authority and Shelby County’s more narrow approach goes 
to the question of fit—Katzenbach took a very liberal view of how well 
the remedy has to fit the wrong to be addressed.49 In contrast, the 
congruence-and-proportionality standard requires a much tighter fit, but 
45. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
46. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997). To determine whether there is a fit 
between the remedy imposed by Congress and the evil to be addressed, the Court will “identify with 
some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue,” and then the Court will “examine 
whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional . . . discrimination.” Bd. of 
Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365, 368 (2001). 
47. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532–33 (citation omitted). 
48. Id. at 532 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (alteration in original)). 
49. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court noted: 
By adding this authorization [in section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment], the Framers indicated 
that Congress was to be chiefly responsible for implementing the rights created in 
§ 1 . . . . Accordingly, in addition to the courts, Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate 
the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting. 
383 U.S. at 325–26. Remedial does not, in the eyes of the City of Boerne Court, mean that Congress 
has the authority to decree the substance of rights; rather, Congress can only enforce them, which is 
why the Court requires a record of constitutional violations to support Congress’s exercise of this 
authority. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 
2363–67 (2003). 
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the nature of voting rights makes it difficult for the Court, with its 
limited fact-finding ability, to have the sole responsibility of resolving 
issues of fit. Notably, the Court has never found a civil-rights law 
unconstitutional based on facts external to the congressional record.50 
For example, in Lassiter v. Northampton County,51 the Court held that 
requiring prospective voters to take literacy tests as a prerequisite for 
voting was not a per se violation of the Constitution because the tests 
were reasonably related to exercising the franchise.52 However, the 
Court later upheld Congress’s decision to ban literacy tests because 
Congress developed an evidentiary record illustrating that such tests 
were being used in a discriminatory manner.53 
In the years since City of Boerne, however, the Court has been 
decidedly less deferential to Congress in its decision to reauthorize the 
preclearance regime of the Voting Rights Act.54 Given this precedent, it 
is not surprising that there is anxiety among legal scholars about the 
constitutionality of preclearance as a remedy going forward.55 Coverage 
formula aside, the Court did not directly address Shelby County’s 
argument that preclearance is justified only if the congressional record 
shows that racial discrimination is as rampant now as it was in 1965, 
when Congress first passed the Act.56 
50. See Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s 
History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 56 (2006) (“[T]he Court 
has never held that a civil rights law that was constitutional when enacted may lose its constitutional 
status because of the passage of time and a change in the factual circumstances that pertain to the 
law.”). 
51. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
52. See id. at 51–54. 
53. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 387 U.S. at 327. 
54. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 
193, 201 (2009). 
55. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-Shelby County 
Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013) (arguing that no matter what the outcome 
in Shelby County, voting-rights advocates should prepare for a future without section 5); Ellen D. 
Katz, How Big is Shelby County?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 6:31 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/how-big-is-shelby-county/ (“[T]he Court[] refus[ed] to defer in 
any significant way to Congress’s judgment that the preclearance regime remains necessary . . . .”). 
56.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 24–25, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96). The 
Court invalidated the coverage formula because of the lack of overt discrimination, but did not 
resolve whether the same type of record is required in order to impose the remedy of preclearance 
more generally. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting that, with respect to the congressional 
record, “no one can fairly say that it shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ 
‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965” (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 
U.S. at 201; Katzenbach, 387 U.S. at 308, 315, 331)). Much of the evidence of discrimination 
amassed by Congress in 2006 is based on violations of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and 
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 Section 5 of the VRA operates to block unconstitutional conduct ex 
ante, so, understandably, Congress has had difficulty compiling a record 
of discrimination similar to that present in prior reauthorizations.57 It is 
difficult to square the reality of improved racial circumstances with 
Shelby County’s suggestion that a showing of pervasive and widespread 
discrimination might be required to impose the remedy of 
preclearance,58 but other precedents corroborate this position.59 In Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,60 the Court held that 
the legislative history of Title I of the ADA, which prohibited disability 
discrimination in public employment, did not reveal “a marked pattern 
of unconstitutional action by the States.”61 Rather, Title I represented 
Congress’s “judgment that there should be a ‘comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities,’” a determination that, in the Court’s view, falls in the realm 
administrative denials of preclearance by the Attorney General, neither of which requires a finding 
that the jurisdiction acted with discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, there are some instances in the 
legislative record of official actions taken with discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. 
Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that “between 1982 and 2006, DOJ objections blocked 
over 700 voting changes based on a determination that the changes were discriminatory” and 
“Congress found that the majority of DOJ objections included findings of discriminatory intent”); 
Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of Wan J. Kim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, 
Department of Justice); id. at 21, 82 (statement of Robert McDuff, Attorney, Jackson, Mississippi). 
57. Ellen D. Katz, Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance: A Response to Professor 
Karlan, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 33, 53 (2007) (arguing that the standard “must be adjusted to reflect the 
status of section 5 as an operational statute” designed to “target political processes that continue to 
be compromised by race”); see also Hasen, supra note 33, at 179 (noting that states do not engage 
in widespread discrimination because section 5 has been in effect for over forty years). 
58. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting the parity between covered and noncovered 
jurisdictions in minority voter turnout and registration); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203–04; see also 
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (striking down provisions of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) on the grounds that the evidence relied on by Congress 
was too anecdotal and too narrow geographically to justify extension of the ADEA to all of the 
states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643, 647 
(1999) (accepting that state infringement of patents could violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
invalidating the Patent Remedy Act because Congress did not show that states had been engaging in 
this behavior). 
59. Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1715 (2004) (“[T]he [City of Boerne] Court repeatedly distinguished the 
[RFRA] from the VRA on the basis of the greater factual justification for the latter, [but] the 
passage of time might bode poorly for a clear legislative finding of the continued need for section 
5.”); see also Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation 
and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992 (2010) (suggesting that the pocket trigger of 
section 3(c)’s bail-in provision is more congruent and proportional than section 5 because section 
3(c) requires a showing of intentional discrimination). 
60. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
61. Id. at 373. 
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of defining constitutional rights rather than enforcing them.62 Similarly, 
the Shelby County Court insinuates that, like Title I of the ADA, section 
5 is also a policy preference rather than a remedy designed to address a 
specific pattern of racial discrimination in voting.63 
Nonetheless, there are many occasions—both before and after City of 
Boerne—in which the Court has endorsed the congressional record 
underlying the VRA, despite evidence that it is not based on the type of 
record envisioned by City of Boerne and its progeny.64 These cases 
present a slightly more optimistic answer to the question of whether 
preclearance can ever be a congruent-and-proportional remedy;65 recent 
applications of the standard also underscore this point. In Tennessee v. 
Lane66 and Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,67 the 
Court applied a more deferential variation of the congruence-and-
proportionality standard because the legislation in these cases implicated 
fundamental rights that the Court evaluates under heightened scrutiny.68 
62. Id. at 374. 
63. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (noting that “[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of 
federal decrees are rare,” “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels,” and the “tests 
and devices that blocked access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years”). 
64. Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (holding that a covered jurisdiction in a 
noncovered state had to preclear all changes to their election laws, even if the change is mandated 
by state law because Congress has the power to regulate nondiscretionary conduct that lacks 
discriminatory intent); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132–33 (1970) (detailing the general 
evidence before Congress when it imposed the nationwide literacy test ban including “this country’s 
history of discriminatory educational opportunities,” “a long history of the discriminatory use of 
literacy tests,” and “statistics which demonstrate that voter registration and voter participation are 
consistently greater in States without literacy tests”); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652–53 
(1966) (refusing to look for specific evidence in the record justifying section 4(e) of the VRA, 
which prohibits English literacy as a prerequisite for voting, and concluding that it “is enough that 
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did”); see 
also Hasen, supra note 33, at 200 (reading Lopez v. Monterey County to confirm that “there was 
enough evidence to support the 1982 preclearance decision,” which may support 2006 renewal); 
Katz, supra note 57, at 42 (“Lopez certainly offers support for the claim that section 5 is entitled to a 
different form of review than that employed in the City of Boerne cases. In Lopez, Justice O’Connor 
cites City of Boerne only once, and then solely for the proposition that Congress’ enforcement 
power includes the power to prohibit constitutional conduct and to intrude deeply into state 
sovereign processes.”). 
65. See Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. 
REV. 61, 90 (“Boerne nonetheless recognized that Section 5 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] grants 
Congress a remedial ratchet power . . . to enact remedial or preventative measures for what the 
Court itself would consider to be violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the Court would 
not itself require the specific remedial or preventative measures. That recognition was necessary to 
reconcile Boerne with Morgan and other cases, and more importantly, to avoid rendering Section 5 
nugatory.”). 
66. 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
67. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
68. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23 (upholding Title II of the ADA because plaintiff’s lack of access to 
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Arguably, the Voting Rights Act presents a stronger case than both 
Hibbs and Lane, given that it protects both a suspect class and a 
fundamental interest,69 but questions remain as to the sufficiency of the 
record established by Congress since at least some of the justices are 
convinced that the decline in overt discrimination makes the Act’s 
intrusion on state sovereignty unprecedented and unwarranted.70 The 
Shelby County decision suggests that the Court is gravitating away from 
a broad interpretation of Congress’s enforcement authority that would 
allow it to regulate otherwise constitutional conduct in order to deter 
constitutional violations.71 
Also problematic for the VRA is a case decided two terms ago, 
Coleman v. Court of Appeals,72 which retreated from the more lax 
application of the congruence-and-proportionality standard present in 
Lane and Hibbs, and suggested that the presence of a fundamental right 
may not be sufficient, in and of itself, to reduce the level of scrutiny in 
the courts due to disability violated the Due Process Clause and is therefore subject to “more 
searching judicial review” than discrimination on the basis of disability); Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 
(holding that that the family-care leave portion of the FMLA is a congruent-and-proportional 
remedy to address gender discrimination because “the standard for demonstrating the 
constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than [the] rational-basis 
test . . . [therefore] it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations”); 
Issacharoff, supra note 59, at 1715 (“[I]n Hibbs, the Court appeared to back off the sterner 
implications of City of Boerne, indicating that it might very well carve out a protected area for 
discrimination concerns along the classic frontiers of suspect classes.”). 
69. The Court has yet to invalidate congressional legislation that can be justified based on 
multiple grounds. See Hasen, supra note 33, at 201–02 (“A renewed preclearance provision 
involves race discrimination, so strict scrutiny already applies. But it also involves the right to vote, 
itself a fundamental right. The tone of the Court’s opinion in Lane . . . suggests that the Court is 
willing to defer more to Congress to remedy the more that Congress seeks to protect fundamental 
rights.”).  
70. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 262527 (2013) (suggesting that 
preclearance is unconstitutional for this reason); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009) (same).  
71. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1338 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (arguing that congressional authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
should be limited “to the regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth Amendment” 
(emphasis in original)). Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (suggesting that the decline in 
overt discrimination makes the preclearance regime non-remedial), with City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (observing that Congress may pass legislation under its enforcement 
authority that prohibits acts that do not violate the Constitution in order to prevent constitutional 
violations), and City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980) (same). But see Tolson, 
supra note 8, at 1235 (arguing that congressional authority under the Reconstruction Amendments 
is “‘no less broad than its authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause,’ capable of addressing 
state action that has a discriminatory purpose, that has a discriminatory effect, and that may not 
even violate the substantive provisions of the Amendments” (quoting City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 
176)).  
72. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012). 
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these cases.73 Thus, the congruence-and-proportionality standard, as it 
has developed in the case law, does not appear amenable to arguments 
that voting-rights legislation should be treated differently from other 
exercises of Congress’s enforcement authority. Voting is sui generis 
because section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a textual 
commitment to broad access to the franchise, a distinction that is 
germane to the judicial review of voting-rights legislation passed 
pursuant to section 5. 
B. “The Greater Includes the Lesser”: The Relationship Between 
Sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Shelby County Court purportedly assessed the constitutionality of 
the VRA’s preclearance regime under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments; in reality, the Court did not properly balance these dual 
justifications for congressional authority against the state’s power over 
elections, especially in light of section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.74 Section 2 provides that: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. 
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of 
electors for President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers 
of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to 
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in 
such State.75 
73. See id. at 1338 (holding that the self-care provisions of the FMLA are not a congruent-and-
proportional remedy because Congress did not amass enough evidence of sex discrimination in sick-
leave policies). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42. Besides the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, congressional authority over voting also has been expanded through several other 
constitutional amendments. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting the abridgement of the right 
to vote on the basis of sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (prohibiting the use of poll taxes in 
federal elections); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (prohibiting the abridgement of the right to vote 
for those eighteen and older on the basis of age). 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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Section 2 is an example that courts can draw on in assessing whether 
congressional legislation in this area is “appropriate,” and therefore 
should dictate what “congruent and proportional” means in the context 
of voting and elections.76 Yet, in determining the scope of congressional 
authority, the Shelby County Court ignored both the importance of 
section 2 and its influence on the remaining provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, contrary to the case law. In Richardson v. Ramirez,77 for 
example, the Supreme Court held that states do not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause by disenfranchising felons.78 The Court concluded 
that, because section 2 expressly exempts disenfranchisement grounded 
on prior conviction of a felony, states do not violate section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by excluding these individuals from the 
franchise.79 The Court looked to section 2 for guidance in determining 
the scope of the substantive protections of section 1.80 Under the same 
rationale, Congress’s ability to reduce a state’s representation for 
abridging the right to vote in both state and federal elections under 
section 2 influences the scope of remedies that Congress can adopt under 
section 5. 
1. Section 2 in the Legal Scholarship 
Despite Ramirez, courts and commentators have not carefully 
analyzed section 2, an assessment of which would have revealed that 
Shelby County’s reliance on state sovereignty in this context is 
misplaced. Jack Balkin discusses section 2 very briefly in his most 
recent book, referring to it as a “clear rule about how to resolve key 
unsettled issues of the [Civil] [W]ar,” a description that presumably 
means that there is no need to refer to the constitutional structure or 
legislative history in order to ascertain its meaning.81 Balkin assumes 
76. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 593–94 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that section 2, not section 1, regulates voting rights). 
77. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
78. Id. at 54–55. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (referring to section 2 as an “affirmative sanction” of state felon-disenfranchisement laws 
and thereby exempting them from the scope of section 1); see also Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 
316–17 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the legislative 
debate surrounding the VRA show that Congress did not intend the VRA to apply to felon 
disenfranchisement laws, which would have altered the constitutional balance between the states 
and the federal government). 
81. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 26 (2011); see also id. at 14 (“When the text provides 
an unambiguous, concrete, and specific rule, the principles or purposes behind the text cannot 
override the textual command.”). 
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that, unlike section 1, section 2 is “unambiguous,” leaving no open 
questions to be answered by courts or Congress in interpreting its 
provisions.82 However, Balkin’s interpretation is not true to the text 
given that section 5 gives Congress the “power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”83 This language 
arguably refers to all of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and not just section 1.84 
Similarly, Akhil Amar spends a few pages of his recent work on 
section 2, but unlike Balkin, he concludes that the provision, by virtue of 
its penalty, creates an affirmative right to vote.85 Any time that a state 
disenfranchises its residents in violation of section 2, according to Amar, 
the penalty of reduced representation must be imposed.86 If Congress 
fails to implement the penalty, as it has for well over a century, Amar 
believes that section 2 still creates a general right to vote because “there 
can be no disenfranchisement imposed upon the group of presumptive 
voters textually specified by section 2.”87 
Although they take different views on the meaning of section 2, 
Balkin and Amar make a mistake similar to much of the legal 
scholarship by assuming that the specificity of section 2’s penalty ends 
all inquiry into its interpretive impact on the scope of congressional 
authority under section 5.88 Amar, in particular, views the failure of 
82. Id. at 26 (contrasting “the glittering generalities of section 1” with the “more rule-bound and 
hardwired features of sections 2, 3, and 4”). 
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
84. Note that my argument is not that the Framers explicitly viewed section 5 as an avenue for 
imposing penalties other than reduced representation at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was 
adopted; most of the focus in the legislative debates was on the harshness of the penalty rather than 
discerning if Congress had the authority to pass other penalties to further section 2’s substantive 
protections. Indeed, discussions leading up to the Fifteenth Amendment seem to indicate that there 
were some in Congress who believed that section 2’s penalty was exclusive. See, e.g., CONG. 
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. William Stewart). Post-enactment 
legislation and political realities later forced Congress to embrace a broad reading of its authority 
under both the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Amendments, a view that is consistent with the 
constitutional text. See infra Part II. 
85. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 188 (2012). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 189. 
88. Besides Balkin and Amar, other scholars have focused on different aspects of section 2, such 
as its exemption of felon disenfranchisement. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, 
Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111 (2013). 
Scholars have also debated whether Washington, D.C., is constitutionally entitled to a voting 
member in the House because of section 2’s language that representatives are “apportioned among 
the several states.” See Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional 
Representation for the District of Columbia: Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting Rights Bill 
in Light of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the Creation of the 
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Congress to impose section 2’s penalty as an opening for the courts to 
intervene since “there shall be no disenfranchisement without the 
apportionment penalty”; thus, Congress’s failure to impose the penalty 
led the Warren Court to embrace section 2’s mandate through its voting-
rights cases.89 What Amar overlooks, however, is that the interpretive 
difficulties arise, not from disagreement over who should enforce section 
2, but from the general language in section 5 giving Congress the power 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by “appropriate” means. 
The scope of this authority cannot be determined by reference to the 
text of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which, for example, says 
nothing about section 5 being remedial in nature or lacking a substantive 
component. Yet the Court derived these limitations on congressional 
authority by interpreting the text in light of the legislative history and the 
principles and norms underlying the document as a whole.90 As John 
Hart Ely recognized over three decades ago, the provisions of the 
Constitution range from the specific to the general, and it is impossible 
to supply the content of the more general provisions through clause-
bound interpretivism.91 For example, we know that the Equal Protection 
Clause forbids inequality, but the Court has interpreted its provisions in 
light of current political disputes because of the indeterminacy of its 
words.92 The Clause also has been interpreted in light of other provisions 
District, 60 ALA. L. REV. 783 (2009). Some debate also has been triggered by section 2’s limitation 
to male citizens, see, for example, Reva Siegel, She the People: the Nineteenth Amendment, Sex 
Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002), but there has been no in-
depth consideration of how section 2 influences the scope of congressional enforcement authority 
under section 5. William Van Alstyne has touched on this issue tangentially, arguing that section 2 
is not the exclusive remedy for voting rights violations such that Congress is precluded from relying 
on section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate voting rights. See William W. Van Alstyne, 
The Fourteenth Amendment, the “Right” to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 45 (arguing that there was no consensus in the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress that “§ 2 would preclude Congress (or the courts) from employing sources of 
constitutional authority other than § 2 to affect state suffrage power”). Nonetheless, the trend is that 
most scholars have overlooked the importance of section 2 to modern day debates about voting 
rights. 
89. AMAR, supra note 85, at 189 (arguing that the penalty of section 2 lives through “Warren 
Court right-to-vote case law” and provides a sound textual basis for a general right to vote). 
90. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512–36 (1997). 
91. ELY, supra note 23, at 11–41 (discussing the implausibility of a “clause-bound” 
interpretivism). 
92. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that the 
right to vote is a fundamental interest under the Equal Protection Clause, despite the fact that the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment never intended to create an explicit right to vote); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that the separate-but-equal doctrine of racial 
segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause, despite the lack of historical evidence that the 
Framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to segregation in schools). 
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in the Constitution because, as Ely observes, “we are left with a 
provision whose general concern—equality—is clear enough but whose 
content beyond that cannot be derived from anything within its four 
corners or the known intentions of its framers.”93 Ely focuses on the 
constitutional structure and procedural values derived therefrom in order 
to provide guidance to courts in implementing the substantive policies 
that the text is meant to protect but is simply not clear about.94 More 
recently, Akhil Amar has employed a similar methodology that views 
the clauses holistically, determining the meaning of a word based on 
how the word is used in different constitutional provisions.95 
As with Balkin, Ely, and Amar, the constitutional text and structure 
are the starting point here. Like many of the substantive provisions of 
the Constitution, the meaning and scope of Congress’s enforcement 
authority is also indeterminate, and what legislation is “appropriate” can 
be determined only by reference to sources outside the four corners of 
the text.96 To answer this question, this Article looks at how the 
Constitution in its entirety delegates authority over elections to the states 
and the federal government in order to determine the scope of the 
congressional authority in this area. 
2. The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections 
The Constitution is relatively unambiguous that the states have broad 
authority over elections, but it is also apparent from the text that 
Congress has the authority to intervene in certain instances. The 
Elections Clause of article I, section 4 provides that the states shall 
choose “[t]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding elections,” for 
representatives and senators, but subject to Congress’s ability to “make 
93. ELY, supra note 23, at 31; see also BALKIN, supra note 81, at 12–13 (“[W]hen we ask about 
the ‘meaning’ of the equal protection clause, we could be asking (1) what concepts the words in the 
clause point to; (2) how to apply the clause; (3) the purpose or function of the clause; (4) the 
intentions behind the clause; or (5) what the clause is associated with in our minds . . . .”). 
94. ELY, supra note 23, at 101 (arguing that the Constitution, with only a few exceptions, “has 
been a process of government, not a governing ideology” (footnotes omitted)). 
95. Amar, supra note 23, at 779 (“Ely does not specifically suggest that we attend to the patterns 
of words and phrases that repeat themselves in the document. But if his general methodological 
prescription is not quite intratextualism, as I have defined it, it is rather close. Like intratextualism, 
Ely’s approach invites textualists to read clauses holistically, rather than in isolated, clause-bound 
fashion.”); see also id. at 764 (using intratextualism to bolster Chief Justice Marshall’s judicial-
review analysis in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)). 
96. See, e.g., infra Part II.B (discussing the disagreement among the Framers about whether the 
Fifteenth Amendment would address facially neutral laws that have the effect, but not the intent, of 
abridging the right to vote on racial grounds). 
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or alter such Regulations.”97 As I have argued elsewhere, this provision 
forms the basis of our system of federal elections by giving states 
plenary authority to set the ground rules while Congress retains a veto 
power over state regulations.98 This framework of decentralized control 
exists throughout the Constitution. In article I, section 2 and the 
Seventeenth Amendment, respectively, the people elect members of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. While the states choose the 
“Qualification requisite for Electors,” for both state and federal 
elections,99 Congress retains the ability, under article I, section 5, to be 
“the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own 
Members.”100 Because of its veto authority under the Elections Clause 
and the Qualifications Clause over both who is elected and the manner 
of their selection, Congress retains final say over the composition of the 
federal government, making Congress, not the states, sovereign with 
respect to federal elections.101 
More difficult questions surround the relationship between the states 
and the federal government over the regulation of state elections. The 
states, consistent with their authority under the Tenth Amendment, are 
arguably sovereign with respect to state elections,102 but this sovereignty 
is limited by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.103 Specifically, 
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
98. Tolson, supra note 8; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., __U.S.__, 133 S. 
Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013) (noting that the Elections Clause is a “default provision” that “invests the 
States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress 
declines to pre-empt state choices” (quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997))); Derek T. 
Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012) (arguing 
against a national-popular-vote initiative for presidential elections because eliminating the role of 
the states in selecting the President through the electoral college would undermine our system of 
federalism). 
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
101. See generally Tolson, supra note 8. 
102. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (“[E]ach State has the 
power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen.” 
(quoting Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892))); see also Inter Tribal Council 
of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2263 (noting that the states, not Congress, have the authority to set voter 
qualifications for state and federal elections). 
103. Besides the Amendments’ explicit nondiscrimination principle, another basis for federal 
intervention in state elections is where, for example, “the election process itself reaches the point of 
patent and fundamental unfairness” and therefore implicates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Roe v. Alabama ex rel. Evans, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1060 (2000). Otherwise, states retain 
control over their own elections. Compare Karlan, supra note 33, at 17 (reading the Elections 
Clause as a plenary grant of authority over all elections), with Tolson, supra note 8 (recognizing that 
Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause is not sufficient to justify the scope of section 5 
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section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by preventing abridgment of 
the right to vote on nonspecified grounds, represents an abrogation of the 
sovereignty that the states retained via the Elections Clause and the 
Tenth Amendment. Thus, the pertinent question is this: how much of 
this sovereignty has been delegated to the federal government? The 
answer is not readily discoverable from the constitutional text alone, but 
assessing sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment together helps 
illuminate the scope of this authority.104 
In particular, Congress’s authority to enact lesser penalties than 
reduced representation under section 5 respects the sovereignty that 
states retain over elections, recognizes expanded federal power under the 
Reconstruction Amendments, and is consistent with a principle of 
statutory construction employed by the Court that construes a grant of 
authority to include lesser powers.105 Pursuant to this maxim, one can 
because the states retain limited sovereignty over state and local elections that have no direct federal 
interest). 
104. See BALKIN, supra note 81, at 14 (“[W]here the text offers an abstract standard or principle, 
we must try to determine what principles underlie the text in order to build constructions that are 
consistent with it.”); id. at 260–62 (arguing that history should be used to derive the underlying 
principles of the text and to resolve underlying ambiguities); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (identifying the various modalities of constitutional interpretation 
including the text, structure, precedent, prudential concerns, moral commitments, and history). I am 
not attempting to debate the weight that should be given to each of these considerations or the 
merits of various theories of constitutional interpretation, but it is clear that I am making my case 
largely based on the constitutional text, structure, and legislative history, which most of the various 
theories agree is the starting point for constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Richard H. 
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1189 (1987); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 862 (1989); David 
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
105. Because of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the presence of an explicit power in the 
Constitution has not, to my knowledge, been interpreted to prevent Congress from adopting lesser 
regulations that are incidental to furthering the aims of the primary grant of power. See GARY 
LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 119 (2010) (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
incidental powers defined as “lesser in importance than the principal power” but is not a general 
grant of authority). Similarly, section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Court had 
previously interpreted as similar in scope to the Necessary and Proper Clause, allows Congress to 
impose lesser penalties than section 2’s reduction in representation. The ability to impose lesser 
penalties is still possible post-City of Boerne so long as the congruence-and-proportionality test is 
met, but arguably, the presence of the words “shall enforce” in section 5 gives Congress significant 
authority to determine what means are “appropriate.” See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 
DUKE L.J. 267, 277–79 (1993) (discussing various power-granting provisions of the Constitution 
that include phrases such as “shall think,” “shall judge,” and “shall deem,” and concluding that 
these provisions expressly make a political actor’s judgment—rather than objective necessity, 
propriety, or expediency—the test of constitutionality). 
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view section 2 as a broad grant of authority to Congress but, because of 
the specificity of its penalty, it also can function as a ceiling on 
congressional authority to address abridgments of the right to vote rather 
than a floor.106 In other words, Congress can do no more than reduce a 
state’s delegation, but it has substantial authority under section 5 to 
impose lesser penalties.107 That section 2 represents an extreme penalty 
and therefore a ceiling on congressional authority is based on the view 
that, prior to the Reconstruction Amendments, the states enjoyed broad 
authority over their electoral mechanisms, even with respect to federal 
elections.108 Given this, a lesser penalty arguably is one that intrudes on 
state sovereignty less than the penalty of reduced representation.109 
Section 5’s grant of authority to further the Amendment’s aims through 
“appropriate” legislation incorporated both the strong medicine of 
reduced representation and the ability to impose lesser penalties through 
ordinary legislation.110 
106. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629–42 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (relying on the reasoning that a grant of 
authority includes the lesser powers to reject the invalidation of the Medicaid expansion because 
Congress’s authority to repeal the program altogether necessarily includes the power to alter or 
amend it); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 762–63 (1988) (reasoning 
that the power to prohibit speech includes the lesser power to license it); Posadas de Puerto Rico 
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986) (holding that “the greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising 
of casino gambling”); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 368 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (invoking “the common-sense maxim that the greater includes the lesser”). 
107. Limiting Congress to imposing “lesser penalties” respects the original framework of section 
2 while recognizing that the open-ended language of section 5 delegates some questions of 
application to future generations. See BALKIN, supra note 81, at 15 (“Constitutional doctrines 
created by courts, and institutions and practices created by the political branches, flesh out and 
implement the constitutional text and underlying principles.”). 
108. See infra Part II.A; see also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., __U.S.__, 133 S. 
Ct. 2247, 2271 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the Elections Clause, the States have the 
authority to specify the times, places, and manner of federal elections except to the extent that 
Congress chooses to provide otherwise. And in recognition of this allocation of authority, it is 
appropriate to presume that the States retain this authority unless Congress has clearly manifested a 
contrary intent.”); Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 
UTAH L. REV. 859, 884–87 (discussing the federalism concerns raised by the 1842 Reapportionment 
Act, despite the fact that it required single-member districts for House elections and did not affect 
state and local elections). 
109. Cf. Halberstam, supra note 29, at 948 (noting that section 5 is “nothing like the categorical, 
one-size-fits-all rule of strict equality imposed by the one-person/one-vote cases”).  
110. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 418 n.174 (D.D.C. 2003) (Henderson, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the Tenth Amendment 
challenge to a provision of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that allegedly “restrict[s] the 
activities of federal officeholders and candidates with respect to state and local election campaigns 
and processes” because “the broader, more invasive power of the federal government to regulate 
municipal securities professionals who solicit funds for state officials includes the narrower power 
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Determining whether penalties are less intrusive of state sovereignty 
is admittedly difficult given that congressional authority to regulate 
elections falls along a spectrum.111 On the one hand are the regulations 
that govern the time, place, and manner of federal elections, which is 
when congressional authority is at its apogee.112 Pursuant to this 
authority, Congress also can regulate so-called mixed elections, where 
its regulations can encompass any part of an election involved in the 
selection of congressmen.113 
On the other end of the spectrum are regulations that govern voter 
qualifications and state elections, instances in which congressional 
power is arguably at its lowest.114 In Oregon v. Mitchell,115 for example, 
the Court held that the 1970 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, 
which lowered the voting age to eighteen, were unconstitutional as 
applied to state and local elections because the Amendments 
impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty.116 The Court reasoned that, 
unlike the discriminatory use of literacy tests, which can be prohibited in 
all elections consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment, states retain the 
ability to determine the qualifications of electors in state and local 
to regulate federal candidates who solicit funds for state officials” (emphasis in original)), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
111. In certain instances, there may be a fundamental difference between punishing state officials 
through the criminalization of certain activities and punishing the states as states through reduced 
representation, but I do not think this is dispositive here, given the penalty of reduced representation 
could be triggered through the discriminatory actions of state officials who, in the context of voter 
registration, election design, and ballot access, are usually acting under color of state law, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 (2006). 
112. See Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2253–54 (“The power of Congress over 
the ‘Times, Places and Manner’ of congressional elections ‘is paramount, and may be exercised at 
any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, 
the regulations effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.’” (quoting Ex 
Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880))). 
113. See In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 752 (1888) (holding that Congress’s power to regulate mixed 
elections under the Constitution “cannot be questioned”); United States v. McCranie, 169 F.3d 723, 
727 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that both the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Elections Clause 
empower Congress to regulate mixed elections even where federal candidates run unopposed). 
114. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2258 (“Prescribing voting qualifications, 
therefore, ‘forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government’ by the 
Elections Clause, which is ‘expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the 
manner of elections.’” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 369 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 2003) (emphasis in original))). 
115. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
116. Id. 124–25 (“No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the 
States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the 
qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own 
machinery for filling local public offices.”). 
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elections absent race discrimination.117 The Court acknowledged that 
“the original design of the Founding Fathers was altered by the Civil 
War Amendments and various other amendments to the Constitution,”118 
but declined to find that these changes deprived the states of all 
sovereignty over state and local elections.119 Similarly, the recent case of 
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.120 sharply limited 
Congress’s ability to regulate voter qualifications in both state and 
federal elections, finding that “the Elections Clause empowers Congress 
to regulate how federal elections are held, but not who may vote in 
them.”121 
Remedies that fall somewhere between these two extremes, such as 
the VRA’s preclearance regime, necessarily involve a subjective 
determination about their intrusiveness on state sovereignty as a part of 
the means-ends calculus.122 One relevant factor in the case law in 
assessing fit has been an under-enforced constitutional principle that I 
term the “anti-circumvention norm.” This norm clarifies what it means 
for the right to vote to be “denied . . . or in any way abridged”123 in the 
context of section 2 by allowing Congress to regulate certain voting 
requirements that are presumptively constitutional but would otherwise 
circumvent the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.124 For 
example, Congress could arguably preempt a state law that lacks 
discriminatory intent if there is significant evidence that the regulation 
would effectuate broad disenfranchisement and undermine the 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 126. 
119. Id. at 129. 
120. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). 
121. Id. at 2257. 
122. Amar, supra note 29, at 117 (“Congress itself has hesitated to impose the draconian sanction 
of reduced apportionment on offending states. So Congress, via the VRA, has done something far 
gentler—something altogether proportionate to the core purposes of the right to vote explicitly set 
forth in section 2.”); see also infra Part III. 
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
124. This notion of an “underenforced norm” is borrowed from Lawrence Sager, who views the 
Equal Protection Clause as embodying such a norm and argues that it is constitutional for legislation 
to push equal-protection norms to their full conceptual boundaries, even if it is beyond the Court’s 
interpretation of the Clause. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1215–16 (1978). This norm is not 
intended to undermine the Court’s test in City of Boerne v. Flores, but should be a consideration in 
whether that standard is met. Cf. ELY, supra note 23 (using the value of representation-
reinforcement to fill interpretive gaps in the Constitution); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL 
CONSTITUTION (1993) (using the norm of deliberative democracy to do the same). 
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protections of the Amendment.125 Fidelity to this norm, which is derived 
from the case law and implicit in section 2, helps determine which 
remedies, other than reduced representation, are appropriate to address 
abridgments of the right to vote.126 A review of the legislative history of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments illustrates that this approach 
to assessing the scope of Congress’s authority to enforce voting rights, 
which relies on text, structure, and principle, is not only justified, but 
required. 
II. THE PRESCIENCE OF THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS: 
VOTING, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE FOURTEENTH 
AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS 
The legislative debates over the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments reveal that Congress, in adopting section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, balanced the core values of expanding voting 
rights and retaining state sovereignty over elections. Because of this 
balancing, section 2 stands as the textual archetype of congressional 
remedial power over voting. Thus, rather than relying on abstract 
principles designed to limit the interpretive authority of Congress, as the 
Court did in City of Boerne,127 courts can use section 2 as the reference 
point for determining whether Congress has exceeded the scope of its 
enforcement authority in enacting voting rights legislation. Moreover, 
section 2 remains a viable source of congressional power since section 1 
125. Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008) (upholding 
Indiana’s voter-identification law because there was no evidence in the record that the law would 
result in broad disenfranchisement of indigent voters in the state), with Applewhite v. 
Commonwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 749 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 
2, 2012) (granting a preliminary injunction enjoining Pennsylvania’s voter-identification law 
because the lack of state-issued identification cards would have resulted in broad voter 
disenfranchisement during the November 2012 election even though the law could validly be 
enforced in the future). Arguably, if the state imposes a voter identification law to address an actual 
problem with voter fraud, but makes it fairly easy for individuals to obtain free identification or to 
vote provisionally, then the law would not run afoul of section 2, even if in practice the law results 
in broad disenfranchisement. See Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section 
Twos (Jan. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Generous and easy access to 
photo identification rebuts arguments that the law undermines the protections of the Amendments 
even if, technically, a photo identification-card requirement constitutes an “abridg[ment].” See 
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197–99. 
126. See infra Part III. 
127. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 176 (1997) (“The historical evidence presented in the Boerne 
opinion proves only that Congress was not intended to have authority to pass general legislation 
determining what the privileges and immunities of citizens should be. It does not support the more 
extreme claim that Congress lacks independent interpretive authority.”). 
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of the Fifteenth Amendment was meant to complement rather than 
replace it as a source of congressional authority, giving Congress broad 
power to protect the right to vote.128 
A. Discovering the Framers’ Intent: Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the Baseline for Voting Rights Remedies 
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment drafted section 2 to 
address a unique problem presented by the abolition of slavery: the 
conquered South’s representation in the House would increase by at least 
fifteen seats even if, as expected, southern states would deny the 
franchise to African-Americans.129 African-Americans no longer 
counted as three-fifths of a person, giving the southern states more 
representation in Congress than they had before the war.130 In addressing 
this issue, Congress wanted to protect the franchise from abridgement 
under discriminatory state laws, but without completely displacing the 
constitutional text and principles of federalism that delegated authority 
over elections to the states.131 
128. The courts and the legal scholarship have overlooked section 2 because Congress has never 
used it to reduce a state’s congressional delegation. By the twentieth century, many states in the 
former confederacy, including Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina, legally 
disfranchised African-Americans. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal 
Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 768 n.215 (1998). Scholars 
have attributed this failure to the view that the Fifteenth Amendment has rendered obsolete the 
penalty of section 2, a position that does not fully appreciate the historical circumstances 
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See infra Part II.B. 
Compare JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 12, 16 (1909) (rejecting this argument), with Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon 
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004) (making this argument). 
129. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 23 (1956) (“[T]he 
representation of fourteen former slave states would be increased from eighty-four, on the three-
fifths basis, to one hundred, based on total population. But, if an amendment were passed to base 
representation on qualified voters, those states would lose eighteen representatives instead of 
gaining sixteen.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866) (statement of Rep. 
James Blaine) (proposing that “suffrage instead of population [be] the basis of apportioning 
Representatives” so as to “deprive the lately rebellious States of the unfair advantage of a large 
representation in this House, based on their colored population, so long as that population shall be 
denied political rights by the legislation of those States”). 
130. JAMES, supra note 129, at 23; see also FONER, supra note 36, at 252 (noting that the prewar 
system in which blacks would go from three fifths of a person to being counted in full would, if left 
unchanged, “allow ‘unrepentant . . . traitors,’ in alliance with Northern Democrats, to gain control of 
Congress, compensate slaveowners for emancipation, and elect Robert E. Lee President in 1868” 
(alternation in original) (quoting an unidentified representative)). 
131. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 12 (“There was little real difference in opinion among the 
leaders in Congress as to the desirability of enlarging the sphere of political liberty for the negro 
race. The chief difficulty in accomplishing this result lay in the fact that is could apparently be done 
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Because of this concern, Congress had considerable debate over what 
means would be appropriate to ensure that southern states granted civil 
and political rights to African-Americans. Arguably, most of those 
congressmen involved in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment 
wanted to impose a nondiscrimination principle on the states and require 
that they extend suffrage to all qualified males, regardless of race. But 
there is little doubt that few in the thirty-ninth Congress intended to 
explicitly grant the right to vote through the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
provisions, a move widely viewed as raising federalism concerns.132 
Instead, Representative Thaddeus Stevens offered an amendment to John 
Bingham’s proposed text of section 1133 that would “[s]ecure to all 
citizens of the United States, in every state, the same political rights and 
privileges; and to all persons in every State, equal protection in the 
enjoyment of life, liberty and property.”134 Indeed, this amendment and 
only by limiting the sphere of governmental action in all the States to a corresponding extent. There 
was a feeling too widespread to be safely antagonized that the regulation of the suffrage was a 
matter properly belonging to the state governments.”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 
2665 (1868) (statement of Sen. Roscoe Conkling) (“Without going back of the fourteenth 
amendment to the Constitution, be it ratified now or about to be ratified, it seems to me clear that by 
the unmistakable force of its language the regulation of suffrage in the States belongs to the States 
themselves.”). 
132. Some radicals like Senator Charles Sumner and Representative Thaddeus Stevens hoped that 
the penalty in section 2 would have the practical effect of mandating universal suffrage, but all 
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment, on its face, did not confer this right. The criticism that 
the Framers were trying to achieve indirectly what they could not obtain directly—African-
American suffrage—was repeated throughout the debates in Congress and in public. See, e.g., 
JAMES, supra note 129, at 129 (“[Representative] Rogers averred that by the second section the 
committee majority had been trying to obtain Negro suffrage.”). 
133. Representative John Bingham proposed the following language as a possible section 5, 
although it later became the basis for section 1: 
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure 
to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and 
to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property. 
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham). Whether 
Representative Bingham intended the right to vote be included as a part of the privileges or 
immunities of citizens is contestable, see Kurt Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 
329, 334 (2011) (arguing that the “federal privileges and immunities were those ‘defined in the 
Constitution,’ such as the liberties enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution” 
and that “Bingham expressly limited his efforts to enforcing textually enumerated rights”), but 
arguably, Representative Thaddeus Stevens’s amendment to Representative Bingham’s proposed 
text was designed to add an explicit nondiscrimination principle, see generally Randy E. Barnett, 
Whence Comes Section One? The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 165 (2011) (arguing that, unlike Representative Stevens’s proposal, Representative 
Bingham’s proposal was not limited to nondiscrimination). 
134. JAMES, supra note 129, at 81 (quoting BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION: 39TH CONGRESS, 1895–1867, at 51 (1914)); see 
also id. (“It is obvious that the ‘political rights’ part of the proposed change was intended to open 
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its focus on “equal protection” and granting everyone “the same political 
rights and privileges” was embraced in principle by the Military 
Reconstruction Act of 1867, and represented one of Congress’s first 
attempts to impose equal suffrage in the south through ordinary 
legislation. The Military Reconstruction Act made the governments of 
the southern states established under presidential reconstruction 
provisional until they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and held 
constitutional conventions staffed by delegates “elected by the male 
citizens of said state, twenty-one years old and upward, of whatever 
race, color, or previous condition.”135 
Initially, draft section 2 focused on the denial of “civil and political 
rights,”136 but the Joint Committee on Reconstruction opted to remove 
this language and focus solely on discriminatory denials of the franchise: 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole 
number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed; 
Provided, That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied 
or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons 
of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of 
representation.137 
Congress’s motivation, first in preserving civil and political rights in 
drafts of both sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then later 
in explicitly imposing a penalty for vote denial in section 2, was to 
address the “black codes” adopted across the South following the end of 
the Civil War.138 The black codes created a separate criminal justice 
the way for Negro voting on a national scale.”); Stephen B. Weeks, The History of Negro Suffrage 
in the South, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 671, 684 (1894) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment “had only 
sought to stimulate the states to grant the suffrage to the negro”). 
135. Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, 429. 
136. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1866) (statement of Rep. James Blaine). 
Representative Blaine proposed the following language for section 2: 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be 
included within this Union according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined 
by taking the whole number of persons except those to whom civil or political rights or 
privileges are denied or abridged by the constitution or laws of any state on account of race or 
color. 
Id. at 141–42. 
137. Id. at 351. 
138. See FONER, supra note 36, at 341–42 (noting that Democrats in the South employed violence 
and threats including “cutting off credit to blacks attending Republican meetings,” “landlords 
threaten[ed] to evict from plantations” African-Americans who voted for Republicans, and the Ku 
Klux Klan instituted a “‘reign of terror’ against Republican leaders black and white”); Joe M. 
Richardson, Florida Black Codes, 47 FL. HIST. Q. 365, 373 (1969) (noting that African-Americans 
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system for the former slaves, extensively regulated their labor, 
disenfranchised them, and provided little redress for injustices 
committed against them by whites.139 Violence erupted once state 
leaders sympathetic to radical reconstruction began to endorse plans to 
convene constitutional conventions to enfranchise African-Americans.140 
The black codes and the violence that persisted in the post-war South 
justified the passage of a constitutional amendment allowing Congress to 
intervene in state electoral processes at every level because wrongful 
denial of the vote had become a systemic problem that was not limited to 
federal elections.141 
The remedy imposed by section 2, which sought to disincentivize 
broad disenfranchisement, was appropriately tailored to address this 
harm, particularly given the underlying federalism issues. In the view of 
the Republicans, the draft amendment, by penalizing those states with 
the highest levels of African-American male voters, was the most 
politically palatable and constitutionally tolerable way of protecting 
access to the franchise—and guaranteeing the future of the Republican 
Party—in the South.142 An affirmative guarantee of the right to vote 
had no political rights, could not carry firearms, and could not testify against whites). 
139. See FONER, supra note 36, at 121 (“Freedmen were assaulted and murdered for attempting 
to leave plantations, disputing contract settlements, not laboring in the manner desired by their 
employers, attempting to buy or rent land, and resisting whippings.”); Richardson, supra note 138, 
at 377 (“The passage of black codes by Florida and other southern states was unfortunate and 
unwise. They insured what Florida wanted to avoid—intercession by the federal government.”). 
140. FONER, supra note 36, at 263; see also id. at 412–15 (discussing how some Republicans 
enfranchised ex-Confederates in order to gain power at the state level). 
141. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 472 (1870) (statement of Sen. Eugene Casserly) 
(“‘The right to vote’ of that class of persons [i.e., African-Americans] had been ‘denied or abridged’ 
in many, perhaps most of the States, and might be again in all. Hence there was an evil, real or 
supposed, to be remedied and prevented.”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865) 
(discussing restrictive laws to regulate the labor of blacks in Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana 
and proposing a bill that would invalidate all laws in the former confederacy that maintain 
“inequality of civil rights and immunities . . . by reason or in consequence of any distinctions or 
differences in color”); see also FONER, supra note 36, at 277 (“The astonishingly rapid evolution of 
Congressional attitudes that culminated in black suffrage arose both from the crisis created by the 
obstinacy of Johnson and the white South, and the determination of Radicals, blacks, and eventually 
Southern Unionists not to accept a Reconstruction program that stopped short of this demand.”). 
142. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866). In debating whether representation should 
be based on qualified voters rather than population, Representative Roscoe Conkling argued that 
making qualified voters the basis of representation was less constitutionally problematic than 
depriving states of the power to disqualify voters on the basis of race: 
The second plan mentioned, the proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political 
rights to any class of persons, encounters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon 
the principle of existing local sovereignty. It denies to the people of the several States the right 
to regulate their own affairs in their own way. It takes away a right which has been always 
supposed to inhere in the States and transfers it to the General Government. It meddles with a 
right reserved to the States when the Constitution was adopted, and to which they will long 
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would have created political backlash in the North, where many people 
were against African-American suffrage, and in the South, where ex-
Confederates could easily abridge this right, mandating federal oversight 
for the foreseeable future.143 Instead, the Framers addressed the South’s 
attempt to garner the benefit of increased representation in Congress 
while instituting a legal regime that placed African-Americans in a 
quasi-bondage state by linking representation to eligible voters rather 
than population to deter future wrongdoing.144 The Committee’s draft 
and proposed amendments to section 2 all proceeded from the premise 
that states still had, under the Elections Clause, the authority to choose 
the time, place, and manner of elections, to set the qualifications of 
electors under article I, section 2, and to govern state elections pursuant 
to the Tenth Amendment. However, the South’s denial of basic rights to 
African-Americans meant that this power could no longer be 
unencumbered.145 
cling before they surrender it. 
Id.; see also JAMES, supra note 129, at 22 (“[S]uch great emphasis on representation in 1865 seems 
to have been prompted by a desire for Negro votes in the near future as an aid to national 
Republican power . . . .”). 
143. See FONER, supra note 36, at 241 (noting that moderate Republicans were not “enthusiastic 
about the prospect of black suffrage, either in the North, where it represented a political liability, or 
the South, where it seemed less likely to provide a stable basis for a new Republican party than a 
political alliance with forward-looking white Southerners”). 
144. Unsurprisingly, attempts to enfranchise African-Americans made the Republican Party 
unpopular with southern whites, and the hope was that section 2 would help account for this lack of 
support in elections going forward by ensuring that African-Americans remained enfranchised. See 
William A. Russ, Jr., The Negro and White Disenfranchisement During Radical Reconstruction, 19 
J. NEGRO HIST. 171, 177 (1934) (“The existence of the Republican party is bound up with the 
establishment of Negro suffrage. If it fails here its career as a national party is closed. If it falters in 
this course it must die.” (quoting ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, Oct. 19, 1867)). Moderate 
Republicans like Representative Bingham did not necessarily endorse this position. JAMES, supra 
note 129, at 130 (noting that Representative Bingham claimed that section 2 “only equalized 
representation among the states”). But by 1866, Representative Bingham believed that the southern 
states should be readmitted once they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and established black 
suffrage. Id. at 274; see also MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 17–18 (“[T]he national legislature 
endeavored by every means in its power to make negro suffrage in the South as permanent as a 
constitutional amendment would make it, without in any way affecting the control of the Northern 
States over the qualifications of their voters.”). 
145. This concern about state sovereignty has to be placed in the broader context of 
Reconstruction, where the federal government was already intervening in southern life to an 
unprecedented extent. To minimize the intrusion, many Democrats, ex-Confederates, and Moderate 
Republicans expressed their willingness to extend suffrage to African-Americans in order to punish 
ex-confederates, avoid reduced representation in Congress, and to change the terms of the national 
debate from African-American suffrage to other issues, but once the political tides changed, many 
of these individuals planned to use their new political capital to undo the gains made by African-
Americans. FONER, supra note 36, at 271. Section 2 gave Congress the authority to prevent 
backsliding. 
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That Congress made the proper means-ends determination with 
respect to section 2 is best illustrated by the debate over its scope. 
Despite the substantial record of civil-rights violations in the South, 
there still was considerable disagreement over how the penalty in section 
2 would punish those states that abridged the right to vote. During 
discussions in the House, for example, some representatives noted that 
limiting the penalty in section 2 to abridgments on the basis of race 
could easily be circumvented by the states. As one scholar observed, the 
debates over early drafts of section 2 reflected this concern: 
Thomas Jenckes of Rhode Island . . . objected that Southern 
States by property qualifications could easily get around the 
Reconstruction Committee’s bill, though not depriving Negroes 
of the right to vote because of race or color. He asserted that if 
South Carolina adopted a requirement that voters own fifty acres 
of land, the Negroes would be just as easily disfranchised as by 
a law based on race or color. The objection that property 
qualifications were not covered by the bill was also raised by 
Thomas Eliot of Massachusetts, and by Jehu Baker of Illinois, 
who declared that “no State should reserve in her basis of 
representation persons disfranchised and not represented, no 
matter on what ground she so excludes them.”146 
Other representatives also questioned how property and educational 
qualifications would operate given draft section 2’s limitation to 
abridgments based on race. Representative Roscoe Conkling, a member 
of the Committee on Reconstruction, responded that both of these 
qualifications would be permissible “if framed to operate impartially on 
both races,”147 implying that neutral criteria discriminately applied could 
trigger the penalty of section 2. 
Nevertheless, the Senate rejected the language in the House version, 
which excluded “all persons of such race or color . . . from the basis of 
representation” whenever the right to vote is abridged.148 Pursuant to this 
language, discrimination against one African-American conceivably 
could remove the entire population of African-Americans from the 
state’s basis of representation.149 Many Republicans viewed this 
146. George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 97–98 (1961) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 376, 385, 406 (1866)). 
147. JAMES, supra note 129, at 61–62; see also id. at 133 (noting that Senator Sherman found 
section 2 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment “as the most objectionable feature because under 
it intelligence tests as a voting qualification would be discouraged”). 
148. Id. at 60. 
149. Id. at 57, 60. 
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outcome as disproportionate to the harm to be addressed and the 
equivalent of forcing African-American suffrage on the South. 
In contrast, leading radical Charles Sumner condemned the language 
in section 2 for “acknowledging that states were entitled to limit suffrage 
on racial grounds” since the provision implicitly countenanced the 
South’s ability to discriminate on the basis of race or color by not 
directly forbidding it.150 After the Senate rejected the House proposal, 
members of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction proposed an 
alternative draft. Notably, the key differences from the earlier proposal, 
addressing the concerns raised by Sumner and others, is the proportional 
reduction of representation for abridging the right to vote and the 
elimination of racial discrimination as the sole basis for reduction: 
[W]henever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied to 
any portion of its male citizens, not less than twenty-one years 
of age, or in any way abridged, except for participation in 
rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation of such 
States shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.151 
In removing the reference to “race or color,” the proposed amendment 
embraced two important insights ultimately endorsed in the final 
version.152 First, it embraced that discrimination in voting could occur 
by proxy and the express reference to “race or color” limited Congress’s 
ability to act when such discrimination occurs.153 While some in the 
Senate wanted to remove this language in order to avoid placing any 
150. FONER, supra note 36, at 253, 255; see also JAMES, supra note 129, at 73 (noting that 
Senator Sumner objected “to bringing inequalities into the language of the Constitution;” that the 
amendment “sanctioned taxation without representation;” and finally, that the amendment “made 
concessions to state rights” while compromising “human liberty” on the basis of color). 
151. JAMES, supra note 129, at 112; see also Zuckerman, supra note 146, at 101 (“[T]he debates 
in Congress had shown that qualifications based on race or color were not the only way Negroes 
could be disfranchised; property or educational qualifications might also operate to achieve the 
same result. Thus the committee searched for language extending beyond qualifications based on 
race or color in determining the basis of representation. The committee searched also for language 
which, in form at least, would be applicable to all states and avoid charges of sectionalism and 
which would be strong enough to satisfy the radicals who claimed that the previous amendment 
sanctioned disfranchisement based on race or color.”). 
152. James contends that the exclusion of the term “race or color” was an oversight, JAMES, 
supra note 129, at 113, but this does not square with the fact that a resolution introduced by a senate 
member of the Joint Committee also excluded the term “race or color,” id. at 92, and that the final 
version added the language “in any way abridged,” which intentionally provides a broader basis for 
which the penalty of reduced representation would be exacted. 
153. Zuckerman, supra note 146, at 97–98 (discussing how some Republicans did not want to 
limit section 2’s penalty solely to abridgment on the basis of race or color). 
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obligation on the northern states to enfranchise African-American 
voters, its removal also gave Congress authority under section 2 to 
penalize states for discrimination on grounds other than race. 154 
Second, the exemption of abridgments based on “treason or crime” 
from the penalty of section 2 is Congress’s assessment that it could not 
remove all authority from the states to regulate the franchise, especially 
since commission of a crime had long served as a basis for 
disenfranchisement in the states. Although “treason or crime” could 
serve as a proxy for racial discrimination similar to property and 
educational qualifications,155 this exemption promoted African-
American suffrage in the short term by allowing states to disenfranchise 
ex-confederates and prevent them from regaining power.156 
Arguably, Congress’ analytical exercise in crafting section 2, a 
penalty that balanced the states authority over elections against 
extending the right to vote on a nondiscriminatory basis, represents the 
proper baseline from which to assess congressional legislation enacted 
pursuant to section 5. Section 2, although clearly designed to change the 
status quo, embraces a nondiscrimination principle rather than an 
explicit right to vote to respect federalism.157 Functionally, this means 
that states can still choose the qualifications of electors, so long as they 
do so in a nondiscriminatory manner. 
Section 2’s influence also extends beyond the context of the 
154. Id. at 98–102. 
155. See Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement 
and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584, 1591 (2012) (noting that legislation 
adopted contemporaneously to section 2 used language narrower than the provision’s “other crime” 
language in order to “combat racist disenfranchisement” based on crime); id. at 1628 (noting that 
the Military Reconstruction Act permitted disenfranchisement only for the commission of “a felony 
at common law”). 
156. Russ, supra note 144, at 171 (observing that “one of the chief reasons in the minds of 
idealists of the radical party for disabling white leaders [was] that blacks should be permitted to 
function unhampered”). Another possible reason for inclusion of the “treason, or other crime” 
language but not other grounds is because this is the only language which would receive a majority 
of the votes in the Senate. See JAMES, supra note 129, at 68 (stating that although “[r]epresentation 
based on voters would be unfair to the East and to border states like Missouri in which 
disenfranchised ex-Confederates constituted a large part of the population,” the principal merit of 
the amendment, according to at least one representative and supported by others, “lay in its 
possibility of adoption; for it ‘accomplishes indirectly what we may not have the power to 
accomplish directly’” (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866) (statement of Sen. 
William Fessenden))). 
157. FONER, supra note 36, at 259 (“The Fourteenth Amendment can only be understood as a 
whole, for while respecting federalism, it intervened directly in Southern politics, seeking to conjure 
into being a new political leadership that would respect the principle of equality before the law.”); 
cf. AMAR, supra note 85, at 188 (arguing that because of the nature of its penalty it effectively 
operates as an affirmative grant). 
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Fourteenth Amendment. Because of their shared drafting history, section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment stand as aggregate sources of authority for voting rights 
legislation, a fact best illustrated by the Enforcement Act of 1870. 
B. Discovering the Framers’ Intent: The Scope of Congressional 
Enforcement Authority over Voting Rights 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in its final form, reflects a 
series of political compromises balancing Congress’s concerns over 
intruding on the state’s authority over elections against its desire to 
expand access to the franchise.158 The Framers adopted section 2 to 
protect the newly freed slaves from being disenfranchised through direct 
and indirect means once the southern states were allowed back into the 
union.159 Once it became evident that disenfranchisement would proceed 
on a massive scale if southern whites regained power, the Framers 
passed the Fifteenth Amendment.160 The breadth of section 2, and its 
extension to both state and federal elections, gave Congress significant 
authority to regulate the franchise through indirect pressure; however, 
section 2 has to be read in conjunction with the Fifteenth Amendment in 
order to illuminate the actual scope of Congress’s enforcement authority. 
This interpretive approach is supported by Supreme Court precedent 
contemporaneous to the Framing that relied on intratextualism to derive 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.161 For example, in the 
Slaughter-House Cases,162 a group of individuals challenged a law 
creating a state-authorized monopoly requiring all butchers to slaughter 
their livestock at one central location.163 The Court held that this 
monopoly did not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the Clause protects only those rights 
158. FONER, supra note 36, at 251–61. 
159. JAMES, supra note 129, at 22. 
160. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1869) (statement of Sen. Henry Wilson) (“The 
crowning act of emancipation, the great constitutional amendment, was sternly resisted. The 
fourteenth article of amendment to the Constitution, the civil rights bill, the Freedman’s Bureau bill, 
every measure that we have passed to enlarge the rights of privileges of that emancipated race, to 
protect them, to life them, has encountered not only the sternest opposition of those who were 
against us politically, but it has encountered the prejudices of a portion of those who ordinarily vote 
with us.”); FONER, supra note 36, at 412–59 (discussing how some Southern Democrats tried to 
convince the nation that they were beyond racial issues, but that most still refused to accept the 
reality of Reconstruction and African-American suffrage). 
161. Amar, supra note 23. 
162. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
163. Id. at 59–60. 
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belonging to “citizens of the United States” rather than “citizens of a 
state.”164 Notably, the Slaughter-House Cases Court looked to the 
Articles of Confederation, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
article I, and the case law in making a distinction between those rights 
protected by United States citizenship and those belonging to citizens of 
a state.165 
Like the Privileges and/or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and article I, the textual and historical link between section 
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment and section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, both dealing with abridgments of the right to vote and 
linked by the drafting history, mandate that they be interpreted in light of 
each other in determining the scope of congressional authority.166 In 
particular, since section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment predates section 
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, section 2 is instructive in determining 
what Congress understood the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment to be, 
and what that provision added to Congress’s ability to enforce the 
nondiscrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment.167 Less clear 
are the prudential considerations that are relevant to interpreting 
congressional authority jointly under these Amendments, as Congress 
has never utilized the penalty of section 2.168 Nevertheless, the 
legislative history indicates that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment were supposed to complement 
each other as sources of congressional authority over voting, and thus 
should be read together. 
1. The Historical Link Between Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
There is a historical and textual link between the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments because language originally proposed for section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment ultimately became the basis for section 
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment.169 In addition to the committee’s draft 
164. Id. at 74. 
165. Id. at 75. 
166. See Amar, supra note 23. 
167. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 14 (arguing that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, “[a]s 
far as subject matter is concerned[,] is really more germane to the Fifteenth Amendment than to the 
other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
168. See BOBBITT, supra note 104, at 13 (identifying prudential concerns as one of the modalities 
of constitutional interpretation). 
169. See MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 11–12 (arguing that section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is consistent with the Fifteenth Amendment). 
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section 2 that passed the House, there were two alternative proposals on 
the table in early 1866 that would have prevented, or alternatively, 
penalized states for denying the right to vote on the basis of race of 
color. The first proposal, put forth by Senator Fessenden of Maine, 
provided that: 
All provisions in the Constitution or laws of any State whereby 
any distinction is made in political . . . rights or privileges on 
account of race . . . or color shall be inoperative and void.170 
In contrast, the Blaine proposal stated that: 
[W]henever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged on 
account of race . . . or color, all persons of such race . . . or color 
shall be excluded from the basis of representation.171 
Looking at the text of the Fifteenth Amendment, it is clear that 
Fessenden’s draft influenced the basis of that Amendment,172 and 
Blaine’s proposal is closest to the text adopted by the House as the basis 
for section 2’s “indirectly coercive” method of protecting the 
franchise.173 The House favored this language because, unlike 
Fessenden’s proposal, it would not disturb the states’ plenary authority 
to choose the qualifications of electors.174 
Notwithstanding the potential federalism costs of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, many of the Framers viewed it, standing alone, as applying 
only to disenfranchisement on the three specified grounds (race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude) and therefore inadequate to address the 
ingenious ways in which states could potentially disenfranchise African-
Americans.175 Indeed, the Framers had concerns that listing specified 
170. Id. at 11. 
171. Id. at 11–12. 
172. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 12 (“The 
Fessenden plan, which involved the idea that finally took definite shape in the Fifteenth 
Amendment, was intended to secure the right of suffrage to negroes by a direct guarantee.”); cf. 
Chin, supra note 128, at 261 (overlooking the connection between the language of section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
173. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 12 (“The Blaine plan . . . aimed at the same object [as the 
Fessenden plan] by the indirectly coercive method of minatory inducements.”). 
174. Id.; see also Zuckerman, supra note 151, at 97. 
175. MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 45 (“Williams of Oregon thought that if a State should pass 
disenfranchising legislation not based on any of the three specified grounds it would be valid 
legislation as far as the Amendment was concerned. . . . The white people of a State might decide 
that the negroes were disloyal, or were disturbers of the public peace, and on that account should not 
be allowed to vote.”); see also id. at 46–47 (“Conkling of New York also considered the 
Amendment utterly inadequate and ineffective on account of its omissions. One obvious method by 
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grounds upon which a state may not disenfranchise in the Fifteenth 
Amendment impliedly authorized a state to disenfranchise on other 
grounds.176 Yet this language of the Fifteenth Amendment, substantively 
narrower but broader in the scope of available penalties than section 2 of 
the Fourteenth, is consistent with the view that the states retained some 
of their sovereignty over elections post-Reconstruction.177 The Fifteenth 
Amendment directly intruded on the ability of states to choose the 
qualification of electors, but unlike the substantive provisions of section 
2, it does not contain the broad language that prohibits states from 
abridging the right to vote on almost any grounds.178 
Given this, the structure of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment are best viewed as two halves 
of a whole: under section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can 
reduce representation for almost any abridgment whereas under section 
1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress could impose almost any 
penalty for abridgment on three specified grounds.179 The history of the 
which it could be evaded, he said, was the full power which it allowed any State to provide by law 
that ‘disingenuousness of birth’ [i.e., birth out of wedlock] should be deemed a disqualification to 
exercise the right to vote.”). Other Framers believed that the use of proxies in and of themselves 
could be discrimination based on race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 
41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3655 (1870) (statement of Sen. Jacob Howard) (noting that some courts may 
construe the Fifteenth Amendment narrowly because it “forbids a certain thing to be done . . . and 
that thing is denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude” and “[t]hat is all there is of it”). 
176. See MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 45 (“To provide in the Constitution that the States should 
not disenfranchise for the three specified causes [race, color, previous condition of servitude] was 
impliedly to authorize them to disenfranchise for all other conceivable causes. Thus the Amendment 
would operate as a virtual legalization of disfranchisement. Under it an aristocracy of property, of 
intellect, or of sect might be established. Although the animus of the Amendment was a desire to 
protect and enfranchise the colored people, yet it was anticipated that under it nine tenths of them 
might be prevented from voting by the requirement on the part of the States of intelligence or 
property qualifications.”). Arguably, this interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment is avoided if it 
is read in conjunction with section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its prohibition on 
abridging the right to vote on grounds beyond race discrimination. 
177. Some representatives pointed to section 2 as evidence that the states retained their authority 
over the qualification of electors and therefore Congress could not prohibit states from altering their 
state constitutions in order to disenfranchise African-Americans. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Henderson) (making this point); id. at 2665 (statement of 
Sen. Roscoe Conkling) (same); infra text accompanying notes 194–98. But see CONG. GLOBE, 40th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2606 (1868) (statement of Sen. William Stewart) (denying that section 2 expressly 
authorizes states to deny its citizens the right to vote). 
178. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3665 (1870) (statement of Sen. Garrett Davis) (making 
this point); see also id. app. at 472 (statement of Sen. Eugene Casserly) (noting that the Fifteenth 
Amendment “is more limited in its language” than the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments). 
179. See Chin, supra note 31, at 263 (conceding that “[s]ection 2 could still have an independent 
role if it were construed to cover suffrage restrictions other than race” but concluding that it cannot 
play this role because it has been narrowly construed by the courts). But see AMAR, supra note 85, 
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Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments indicates that the Framers were 
primarily concerned with expanding federal power while still retaining a 
substantial amount of state sovereignty;180 they were not trying to limit 
their authority by replacing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment with 
Section 1 of the Fifteenth. 
Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment in order to provide 
additional authority for direct intervention in state electoral processes for 
several important practical and political reasons.181 The first is the 
recalcitrance of the ex-Confederates in denying African-Americans basic 
rights, a state of affairs unlikely to be corrected through indirect 
coercion.182 Congress hoped, but could not guarantee, that the penalty of 
reduced representation would induce states to extend the vote equally. 
Second, the Fifteenth Amendment, in conjunction with the Fourteenth, 
provided broad enforcement authority, allowing Congress to reinforce 
the gains secured by the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867 and 
prevent post-Reconstruction governments from altering their state 
constitutions to abridge the right to vote on the basis of race.183 
Most important, the Fifteenth Amendment was less dependent on the 
vagrancies of politics than section 2 of the Fourteenth. 184 Because of the 
at 189 (arguing that section 2 creates an affirmative right to vote). 
180. See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, 
at 135 (1990) (noting that moderate and conservative Republicans endorsed a “constitutional 
amendment dealing with suffrage [that] would admittedly be an infringement on states’ rights, but at 
the same time, it could be a narrowly defined federal encroachment that would leave the balance of 
power between the state and the federal governments otherwise unaltered”). 
181. Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment on February 26, 1869, and it was ratified by the 
states on March 30, 1870, four years after the Fourteenth Amendment. MATHEWS, supra note 128, 
at 34, 75. 
182. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the Fifteenth, 74 NW. U. L. 
REV. 311, 321–23 (1979). 
183. There is a strong argument that, although the Military Reconstruction Act emerged from 
Committee with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act was likely unconstitutional. See David Currie, 
The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 412–14 (2008). However, the Fifteenth 
Amendment arguably could prevent states from amending their Constitutions to discriminate in 
voting on the basis of race. 
184. See Paolo E. Coletta, The Democratic Party 1884–1910, in 2 HISTORY OF U.S. POLITICAL 
PARTIES 987, 987 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1973) (“Once the southern states were readmitted 
to the Union, the Democrats staged a strong comeback, winning the House of Representatives in 
1874, the popular vote for the presidency in 1876 and the Senate in 1878.”). The Republicans won a 
huge victory in 1872, winning both the presidency and 196 of 281 congressional races that year, but 
this win could be attributed to votes from the ex-slaves in the former confederacy. Indeed, the size 
of the Republican victory masked a split in the party between prominent Republican leaders and 
President Ulysses S. Grant over alleged corruption and economic policy that would ultimately lead 
to huge losses for Republicans in the 1874 mid-term elections. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, BY ONE 
VOTE: THE DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876, at 17 (2008). 
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politics of the time, implementation of section 2’s penalty depended on 
both Houses of Congress having a Republican supermajority. After the 
election of 1868, Congress realized that once the South was fully 
integrated back into the union, the ex-confederates would move quickly 
to abolish African-American suffrage despite the dictates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and restrictions in their state constitutions.185 
Congress could no longer unilaterally ensure the success of 
Reconstruction. Thus, the political penalty of section 2 reflected 
Congress’s distrust of the courts and the President in 1866,186 whereas 
the Fifteenth Amendment embraced Congress’s realization, by 1869, 
that it may need the courts as well as additional sources of authority for 
itself to continue Reconstruction.187 
Although the Fifteenth Amendment arguably supplements Congress’s 
authority under the Fourteenth, some scholars contend that the Fifteenth 
Amendment repealed section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment upon its 
adoption.188 Admittedly, several moderate Republicans supported this 
reading of section 2 during the debates over the Fifteenth 
Amendment.189 Similarly, George Boutwell and James G. Blaine, 
writing about the Fourteenth Amendment almost two decades after its 
adoption, argued that section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment repealed 
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.190 However, these Framers, 
185. Republicans waited until after the election of 1868 to propose the Fifteenth Amendment, so 
that it would not be an election year issue, but they believed the Amendment was necessary 
because, as one scholar noted, “the attitude of southern whites left no doubt that if . . . no additional 
warrant should exist for the further interference of Congress in the Southern States, negro suffrage 
would be doomed.” MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 20–21.  
186. See 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 89 
(1971) (“[The Reconstruction was a] dark period [when t]hose who lost in battle early sought 
sanctuary in appeals to the Court; the portents it gave out were such as to bring upon it the menaces 
of Congress. For a season, judicial authority was openly defied.”). 
187. By 1869, the Republicans were only five years (or two elections) away from losing control 
of the House of Representatives. Coletta, supra note 184, at 987. Even those Framers who believed 
that the Fifteenth Amendment repealed section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized that, at 
the very least, the Fifteenth Amendment brought the courts back into the role of enforcer, but there 
is no evidence that the Framers believed that the court was the only entity charged with playing this 
role. 
188. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 128, at 263 (“Section 2 is like the Fifteenth Amendment, except 
that it covers fewer people, fewer elections, and offers more limited remedies. Lesser in every way, 
Section 2 could never provide the rule of decision once the Fifteenth Amendment became law.”). 
189. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2720 (1870) (statement of Sen. John Pool) 
(arguing that the “necessity for [section 2] has since been entirely superseded by the fifteenth 
amendment”). 
190. See Chin, supra note 128, at 272–73 (discussing Representatives George Boutwell and 
James Blaine). 
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writing at a time when African-Americans had been disenfranchised in 
the south despite the penalty of section 2, likely made this argument to 
show that the burden had shifted from Congress to the courts to enforce 
the Amendments.191 Arguably, Boutwell and Blaine try to minimize 
Congress’ impotence in the wake of clear constitutional violations by the 
states in the decades following the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In addition, Boutwell argued at the time of the framing that 
the Fifteenth Amendment was necessary because the Fourteenth 
Amendment only limited the power of the states to abridge the right to 
vote, not the power of the United States government;192 this suggests 
that his support for the repeal theory developed well after the framing of 
the Amendments. Indeed, there is little evidence that the consensus view 
was that, upon its adoption, the Fifteenth Amendment would supersede 
or repeal section 2 of the Fourteenth. 
Before the Joint Committee introduced the Fifteenth Amendment in 
Congress in January 1869, there were proposals on the table that would 
have prevented states from altering their state constitutions to 
disenfranchise individuals or a class of persons.193 The legislative history 
surrounding these proposals offers significant evidence that very few 
people actually believed section 2 was a dead letter upon the adoption of 
the Fifteenth Amendment; in fact, opponents of the legislation pointed to 
section 2 as evidence that states retained the authority to choose the 
191. Compare GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE END 
OF THE FIRST CENTURY 389 (1895) (“By virtue of the Fifteenth Amendment the last sentence of 
Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment is inoperative wholly, for the Supreme Court of the 
United States could not do otherwise than declare a State statute void which should disenfranchise 
any of the citizens described.”), with CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of 
Rep. George Boutwell) (reading section 1 and section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment together in 
order to prohibit states from abridging the right to vote on the basis of race), and 2 JAMES G. 
BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 418–19 (1886) (“Before the adoption of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, if a State should exclude the negro from suffrage the next step would be for Congress 
to exclude the negro from the basis of apportionment. After the adoption of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, if a state should exclude the negro from suffrage, the next step would be for the 
Supreme Court to declare that the act was unconstitutional, and therefore null and void.”). 
192. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 560 (1869) (statement of Rep. George Boutwell) 
(“[T]there is no provision in the Constitution by which the United States is denied the power of 
abridging the right of citizens to vote. There is, in the fourteenth article of amendments to the 
Constitution, a limitation upon the power of the States in that respect, but none upon the power of 
the United States. The amendment which we propose secures the people against any abridgment of 
their electoral power, either by the United States or by the States. In that alone there is sufficient 
reason to justify the amendment.”). 
193. When Arkansas sought readmission back into the union, the following bill, for example, was 
proposed as a condition of readmission: “That the constitution of Arkansas shall never be so 
amended or changed as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the right to 
vote.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2609 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Sherman). 
 
                                                     
09 - Tolson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  10:59 AM 
420 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:379 
qualification of electors and Congress could not prevent states from 
altering their constitutions in matters of voting.194 
During these debates, supporters of the Fifteenth Amendment made 
two interrelated arguments illustrating the continued validity of section 
2. First, they argued that section 1 and section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, when viewed together, “declared [that] the State has no 
right” to “abridge or deny to a citizen the right to vote.”195 In other 
words, “[b]y the second section there is a political penalty for doing that 
which in the first section it is declared the State has no right to do,” 
supporting the view that section 2 is still operative.196 Second, these 
proponents of the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly conceded the validity 
of section 2, some framing it as a necessary stopgap measure designed to 
penalize the states until Congress could intervene pursuant to its 
authority under section 5,197 while others took a more expansive view of 
its provisions.198 Thus, both proponents (including later supporters of the 
repeal theory) and opponents of the Fifteenth Amendment assumed that 
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment would continue to be valid after 
the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified. 
Sectional politics also undermines arguments that section 2 of the 
194. Id. at 2698 (statement of Sen. James Doolittle) (“The constitutional amendment [section 2] 
thus expressly recognizes in, if it does not confer on, the States the power to disqualify persons from 
exercising the right of suffrage on account of race or color, or any other reason they choose. The 
only faculty which it attaches to a State doing so is that it shall be reduced proportionally in its 
representation. And now for gentlemen to come in here with a bill which on the very face of it 
insists first, that the State shall adopt the constitutional amendment which recognizes the right of the 
State to fix for itself the qualification of voters, and then contains in the same bill a fundamental 
provision that the State shall never exercise the right which your constitutional amendment gives, is 
a monstrous piece of absurdity!”); see also CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 642, 644–45 (1869) 
(statement of Rep. Charles Eldridge) (same); id. at 2741 (statement of Sen. Oliver Morton) (“[T]he 
fourteenth article, the amendment of the Constitution, which we insist shall be made part of the 
Constitution, distinctly recognizes that this power [to choose the qualifications of electors] does 
belong to the States . . . .”) 
195. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 559 (1869) (statement of Rep. George Boutwell); see 
also id. (“If the right to vote for certain officers be denied or abridged, then certain political 
consequences follow [under section 2]; but in the first section there is a distinct declaration this 
cannot lawfully be done.”). 
196. Id. 
197. See id. (“It is here provided [in section 1] that there shall be no abridgment of the privileges 
and immunities of citizens; and in the second section there is a penalty provided for a State that 
disregards the inhibition . . . It was uncertain when Congress would exercise the power conferred by 
the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, and in order that the States should not take advantage 
of their own wrong during the period while Congress might be inactive a penalty was provided.”). 
198. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1625 (1869) (statement of Sen. Jacob 
Howard) (arguing that Congress can grant the right to vote under section 2 through ordinary 
legislation). 
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Fourteenth Amendment and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment either 
have the same scope, or that the latter supersedes the former.199 Many 
northern states did not allow African-Americans to vote, but because this 
group was such a small percentage of the population, there was not a 
great deal of northern opposition to section 2.200 In addition, Congress 
broadened the scope of section 2 by eliminating the reference to race, 
which allowed it to avoid accusations that it was trying to affirmatively 
enfranchise African-Americans while indirectly trying to achieve that 
goal. The Fifteenth Amendment, on the other hand, was politically 
unfeasible at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted because 
many feared its language would be construed as an affirmative guarantee 
of the right to vote, thereby upsetting northern states.201 
Despite the different concerns underlying their respective adoptions, 
post-enactment legislation suggests that congressional authority derived 
from both Amendments, especially given the controversy over whether 
Congress could regulate facially neutral state laws that had the effect, 
but not the intent, of abridging the right to vote on the basis of race.202 
The Court did in fact invalidate such legislation in United States v. 
Reese,203 despite the fact that a collective assessment under both 
Amendments would have rendered the Enforcement Act of 1870, which 
broadly protected the right to vote from both discriminatory and neutral 
abridgements, constitutionally valid. 
199. See MATHEWS, supra note 128, at 17 (“If it had been possible to propose an amendment 
similar in principle to the Fifteenth Amendment which could be made to apply only to the Southern 
States, there is little doubt that it would have been done in 1866.”). 
200. See id. at 13 (“There was no demand by either [political] party that the local autonomy of the 
Northern States should be abridged by depriving them of the power to withhold suffrage from 
negroes, yet this deprivation would be a necessary consequence of enacting a negro suffrage 
amendment to the Constitution. Thus at the outset was encountered the difficulty of dealing with a 
sectional problem by means of constitutional amendment, which, from its necessary generality in 
operation, is apt to produce undesigned results.”). 
201. See id. at 17 (“The extension of suffrage to negroes in 1866 by a direct constitutional 
guarantee was prevented . . . by the opposition to such a measure encountered in the Northern 
States.”). 
202. See id. at 44–48; see also CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 421 (1870) (statement 
of Sen. Joseph Fowler) (noting that the “second section [of the Fifteenth Amendment] may go 
further [than the first section, but it] is a question of doubt whether any more power is conferred by 
the auxiliary than by the primary”); CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of 
Rep. George Boutwell) (conceding that nothing in the Fifteenth Amendment would prevent states 
from requiring property or educational qualifications as a precondition to voting); supra text 
accompanying note 175. 
203. 92 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1875). 
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2. The Enforcement Act of 1870 as a Model for Voting Rights 
Legislation Under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
Although most scholars believe that congressional authority under 
section 2 is limited to the penalty listed in the provision, both the text of 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as post-enactment 
legislation suggests that there is a more plausible reading available. 
Throughout the congressional debates, several representatives argued 
that that the enforcement clauses included authority to not only enforce 
the substantive provisions of the Amendments on their terms, but also 
legislate broadly to enforce their guarantees. For example, during the 
debates over the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress discussed whether it 
had authority under the Amendment to legislate with respect to the black 
codes instituted throughout much of the South.204 As Senator Sherman 
observed: 
Here is not only a guarantee of liberty to every inhabitant of the 
United States, but an express grant of power to Congress to 
secure this liberty by appropriate legislation. Now, unless a man 
may be free without the right to sue and be sued, to plead and be 
impleaded, to acquire and hold property, and to testify in a court 
of justice, then Congress has the power, by the express terms of 
this amendment, to secure all of these rights.205 
The consensus view in Congress seemed to be that the enforcement 
clauses operated in a manner similar to the Necessary and Proper Clause 
of article I,206 a position endorsed by the Court in its pre-City of Boerne 
case law.207 Even John Bingham, the primary drafter of section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, sanctioned this idea, arguing that “adding an 
amendment to the Constitution to operate on all the States of this Union 
alike [will give] Congress the power to pass all laws necessary and 
204. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40–43 (1865) (statements of Sens. John Sherman, 
Lyman Trumbull, and Henry Wilson). 
205. Id. at 41 (statement of Sen. John Sherman); see also id. at 43 (statement of Sen. Lyman 
Trumbull) (“The second clause of [the Thirteenth] amendment was inserted for some purpose, and I 
would like to know of the Senator from Delaware for what purpose? Sir, for the purpose, and none 
other, of preventing State Legislatures from enslaving, under any pretense, those whom the first 
clause declared should be free. It was inserted expressly for the purpose of conferring upon 
Congress authority by appropriate legislation to carry the first section into effect . . . . What that 
‘appropriate legislation’ is, is for Congress to determine, and nobody else.”). 
206. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3663 (1870) (statement of Sen. Allen 
Thurman) (“[T]hat provision about appropriate legislation is nothing more than the old provision in 
the Constitution which gives Congress power to pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying the 
provisions of the Constitution into effect, and is to be interpreted in the same light.”). 
207. See supra Part I.A. 
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proper to secure to all persons . . . their equal personal rights.”208 
Similarly, other representatives believed that, with respect to voting 
rights, Congress’s authority to legislate broadly was not limited to 
addressing discrimination based on race.209 Indeed, the Enforcement Act 
of 1870, which Congress passed pursuant to its authority under the 
Fifteenth Amendment, included language similar to section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment extended beyond discriminatory denials of the 
ballot based solely on race.210 
The Enforcement Act of 1870 required that all citizens be able to vote 
“at any election by the people in any State, Territory, district, county, 
city, parish, township, school district, municipality, or other territorial 
subdivision” without regard to “race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”211 Section 3 of the Act provided criminal penalties for “any 
judge, inspector, or other officer of election whose duty it is or shall be 
to . . . give effect to the vote of any such citizen who shall wrongfully 
refuse [to] give effect to the vote of such citizen,”212 and section 2 
penalized any such person or officer for failing to “give to all citizens of 
the United States the same and equal opportunity to perform such 
prerequisite, and to become qualified to vote without distinction of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.”213 Notably, section 4 extended 
this criminal penalty to “any person [who] by force, bribery, threats, 
intimidation, or other unlawful means, shall hinder, delay, prevent, or 
obstruct . . . any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify 
him to vote or from voting at any election” but without the limitation 
that the vote denial be based on race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.214 
Although most of the legislative debates surrounding the Enforcement 
Act centered on Congress’s authority to “enforce” the provisions of the 
Fifteenth Amendment,215 the text of the Act, encompassing the 
208. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. John Bingham). 
209. See id. at 358 (statements of Reps. Roscoe Conkling and Andrew Rogers). 
210. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. 
211. Id. § 1. 
212. Id. § 3. 
213. Id. § 2. 
214. Id. § 4. 
215. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 473 (1870) (statement of Sen. Eugene 
Casserly) (arguing that, if the Fifteenth Amendment reaches individuals, “it is only on those who are 
officers, and hence the agents of the State”); id. at 355 (statement of Sen. William Hamilton) 
(disputing that Congress can impose criminal penalties under the Fifteenth Amendment because 
“the denial of the exercise of a certain power by the Constitution to a State does not thereby confer 
upon Congress power over the subject-matter of such denial”). 
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substantive protections of both section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, reflects Congress’s aggregate 
authority under the Amendments. While it is certainly possible that 
section 4 of the Enforcement Act was poorly drafted,216 the Supreme 
Court could have endorsed a plausible reading of the Act that would 
have given effect to the general purpose behind the Amendments: 
Congress was enforcing the guarantees of both section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (via section 5) and the Fifteenth Amendment in 
order to protect not only voters, but differential treatment that 
undermines the integrity of the ballot. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court ignored that section 2 protects the right of 
suffrage from abridgment, independent of the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
protection of minority voters as a class, when it invalidated the 
Enforcement Act on the grounds that the statute criminalized the actions 
of state officials for any discriminatory denial of the ballot rather than 
just race-based denials.217 The Court reasoned that an elector could 
prove a discriminatory denial of the ballot even if, for example, an 
inspector of elections makes an honest mistake in denying the elector the 
ballot.218 Yet it makes no logical sense that Congress can, consistent 
with section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reduce a state’s 
congressional representation for the same behavior, but cannot pass a 
penalizing statute that would allow the inspector to prevail by showing 
that the denial was in error.219 
Instead, the Court focused on whether the inspector would know that 
his denial of the ballot was wrongful, absent the statute’s express 
limitation to race.220 This narrow focus is somewhat understandable, 
given that Congress passed the statute under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
but the language of section 2 allows Congress to penalize denials of the 
ballot for reasons other than race. Since the Reese Court analyzed the 
Fifteenth Amendment in isolation from the Fourteenth, it overlooked 
216. Some representatives believed that section 4 of the Enforcement Act was limited to race-
based denials, despite the absence of this language in the provision. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 
2d Sess. 3663 (1870) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) (arguing that the fourth section of the 
Enforcement Act is “badly worded,” but the use of the word “‘aforesaid,’ referring to the previous 
section, shows clearly enough that the intention of its framers was to confine the operation of that 
section to offenses against the fifteenth amendment”). 
217. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875); see id. at 219 (holding that section 4 of the 
Act interfered with the state’s authority to choose the qualification of electors). 
218. Id. at 220.  
219. The Court could have achieved this result by construing the statute to require that the vote 
denial be “willful” rather than just “wrongful.” See id. 
220. Id. 
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this key fact. Similarly, in United States v. Cruikshank,221 the Court 
dismissed the indictment against the defendant election inspectors 
because it did not appear that “the intent of the defendants was to 
prevent these parties from exercising their right to vote on account of 
their race,” a conclusion that also assumes, contrary to section 2, that 
Congress is limited to preventing denials of the ballot only on this 
ground.222 
Given its broad authority under both Amendments, Congress could 
have justified the Enforcement Act on the grounds that, if it can reduce 
state representation for abridging the right to vote on any grounds in 
both state and federal elections, it could also criminalize official 
behavior that does the same. In order to achieve broad access to the 
franchise, Congress had to have the power to employ a variety of means 
to further the Fourteenth Amendment’s nondiscrimination principle. 
Unfortunately, the Court’s failure to acknowledge both the text and 
the historical connection between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments also has led it to engage in an interpretive sleight of hand 
to justify extensions of the VRA in the last four decades.223 In reality, no 
such subterfuge is required because the VRA continues to be a 
constitutional exercise of congressional authority. 
III. THE INTRATEXTUAL LEGACY OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AND FIFTEENTH AMENDMENTS: ASSESSING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRECLEARANCE 
An intratextual reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
as a matter of constitutional text, structure, and history illustrates that the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder was wrongly 
decided. Section 2’s penalty of reduced representation serves as the 
baseline from which to assess the constitutionality of voting rights 
legislation passed pursuant to Congress’s enforcement authority; 
selective preclearance arguably falls within the range of penalties that 
Congress can adopt to “enforce” the Amendments. Nevertheless, in 
221. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
222. Id. at 556; see also id. (“The right to vote in the States comes from the States; but the right 
of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. The first has not 
been granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States; but the last has been.”). 
223. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 205, 211 (2009) (resolving the challenge to the bailout 
mechanism of the VRA on questionable statutory grounds in order to avoid ruling on the 
constitutionality of section 5); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (concluding that 
the New York’s English literacy requirement for voters could discriminate against New York’s 
large Puerto Rican community, but not requiring congressional findings that prove this proposition). 
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NAMUDNO v. Holder and Shelby County v. Holder, respectively, the 
Chief Justice expressed two points of concern with respect to the 
constitutionality of section 5 of the VRA that are likely to be relevant in 
any future litigation: (1) it imposes a preclearance requirement that 
suspends all changes to a state’s election laws;224 and (2) it treats 
similarly situated sovereigns differently by requiring some states to 
preclear changes to their election laws but not others.225 I take each of 
these arguments in turn. 
A. Preventing Circumvention Through the Overbreadth of 
Preclearance 
The analysis contained herein regarding the scope of congressional 
authority, premised on the link between sections 2 and 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, can provide a sound constitutional justification 
for the imposition of a preclearance regime that suspends all election-
related changes. Preclearance is a lesser penalty than reducing a state’s 
congressional delegation pursuant to section 2 because it is less intrusive 
of state sovereignty. However, since states have to preclear changes that 
regulate state elections and voter qualifications, preclearance falls closer 
to the end of the regulatory spectrum where congressional power is at its 
lowest ebb.226 
Notably, the legislative record of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments is clear that many state laws regulating access to the 
franchise would not count as an abridgment within the context of section 
2, yet these are the very laws that are required to be precleared under 
section 5.227 For example, many representatives in Congress believed 
that imposing durational residency requirements is consistent with the 
224. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202 (“Section 5 goes beyond the prohibition of the Fifteenth 
Amendment by suspending all changes to state election law—however innocuous—until they have 
been precleared by federal authorities in Washington, D.C. The preclearance requirement applies 
broadly, and in particular to every political subdivision in a covered State, no matter how small.” 
(citations omitted)); see also Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626–27 (2013) 
(describing section 5’s increased incursion on state sovereignty since its original enactment and 
implying that the provision has constitutional problems independent of the coverage formula). 
225. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203 (“The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our 
historic tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’ Distinctions can be justified in some 
cases. . . . But a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing 
that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.” 
(citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960))). 
226. Halberstam, supra note 29, at 948; see also supra Part I.B (discussing the spectrum of 
congressional authority over elections). 
227. I argue in a related piece that section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment would not, for 
example, render voter identification laws per se unconstitutional. See Tolson, supra note 125. 
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state’s authority over elections.228 Some Framers also believed that 
educational requirements and literacy tests are valid so long as they are 
rational and both African-Americans and whites are subject to these 
qualifications.229 Indeed, John Bingham proposed a version of the 
Fifteenth Amendment that would have created an affirmative right to 
vote in which “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge or deny to any male citizen . . . the equal exercise . . . of the 
elective franchise,” but subject to the citizen being male, of sound mind, 
twenty-one years or older, a resident for at least a year, and most 
notably, “subject to such registration laws as the State may establish.”230 
The Framers thus viewed many voting rights regulations as fairly 
pedestrian and not per se unconstitutional under the Amendments.231 
Although the VRA required many regulations that did not raise 
constitutional concerns to be precleared, this remedy prevented states 
from implementing ostensibly neutral laws or taking other official 
actions that had the effect of circumventing the protections of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.232 For example, states were often 
more derelict in submitting changes that governed state and local 
elections for preclearance than those that governed federal elections,233 
many of which were later deemed to be discriminatory and denied 
preclearance. Local governments have been some of the most brazen 
228. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2609 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) 
(arguing that Congress could not prevent voting restrictions “aimed at all persons who had not 
resided within the State for a certain length of time”). This does not mean that suffrage 
qualifications that are generally constitutional can never be invalidated if unreasonable or unrelated 
to the franchise. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (invalidating a durational 
residency requirement that did not adequately promote the state’s interest in preventing fraudulent 
voting or having knowledgeable voters); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866) (statement 
of Rep. Roscoe Conkling) (noting that these regulations can violate the Fourteenth Amendment if 
not applied to everyone equally). 
229. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2701 (1868) (statement of Sen. John Henderson); id. 
app. at 350 (statement of Sen. Richard Yates) (“Exclusions from suffrage for a time, and which 
apply to all men alike, are allowable. If all men are excluded, men of all races, unless they are of 
suitable age, from voting, I do not see anything which would conflict with its being a republican 
form of government. Equality is the basis of a republican government.”). 
230. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 728 (1869). 
231. This does not mean that facially neutral laws that have a discriminatory effect were beyond 
the purview of section 2. See Tolson, supra note 125. 
232. The Framers were also concerned that states would use their authority over elections to 
circumvent the protections of the Amendments. See supra text accompanying notes 146–47. 
233. See Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1991) (holding that the state of Louisiana was 
required to submit every judgeship created under state law for preclearance through the Department 
of Justice, rather than sporadically submitting some judgeships for preclearance as had been the 
state’s practice). 
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violators of the Voting Rights Act, on occasion implementing 
discriminatory laws that the Department of Justice has refused to 
preclear under section 5.234 Shelby County itself has shamelessly 
violated section 5, notably when Calera, Alabama (located within the 
county) held elections under a redistricting plan that the Department of 
Justice refused to preclear because the city eliminated the only majority-
minority district.235 Limiting the preclearance regime to only federal 
elections would not only allow violations such as these to slip through 
the cracks, but also could have the foreseeable effect of deterring 
minority voter turnout in all local, state, and federal elections.236 
The anti-circumvention norm can resolve constitutional concerns that 
might otherwise require a lopsided preclearance regime, as this norm has 
justified the extension of federal authority into areas that are firmly 
within the province of state power. In City of Rome v. United States,237 
for example, the Court observed that Congress can pass legislation under 
section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment in order to prohibit acts that do 
not violate section 1 of the Amendment, “so long as the prohibitions 
attacking racial discrimination in voting are ‘appropriate,’ as that term is 
defined in McCulloch v. Maryland.”238 Similarly, in Katzenbach v. 
Morgan,239 the Court held that legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld “so long as the Court 
could find that the enactment ‘is plainly adapted to [the] end’ of 
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause and ‘is not prohibited by but is 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,’ regardless of 
whether the practices outlawed by Congress in themselves violated the 
234. See, e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Watch Out in the Covered Jurisdictions, REUTERS (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/02/07/watch-out-in-the-covered-jurisdictions/ (noting “a 
disproportionate number of pre-clearance denials involved vote dilution on the local level” over the 
past thirty years). 
235. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice 
Ginsburg also noted other examples of misconduct by state and local governments including the 
cancellation of elections and early voting days to prevent the election of African-Americans in local 
elections; the enactment of a voting scheme for a school board election that earlier had been 
invalidated by a federal court; and voter purges that would have disqualified many voters from 
participating in local elections. Id. at 2640–41. 
236. See, e.g., Michelle Miller & Phil Hirschkorn, Voter ID Bill Raises Controversy in North 
Carolina, CBS NEWS (Aug. 13, 2013, 5:22 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-
57595791/voter-id-bill-raises-controversy-in-north-carolina/ (discussing legislation in North 
Carolina, which had been partially covered under section 5, that would roll back early voting, 
impose a very strict voter identification law, outlaw Sunday voting, and repeal same day 
registration). 
237. 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
238. Id. at 177. 
239. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
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Equal Protection Clause.”240 In these cases, the Court recognized that its 
interpretation regarding the breadth of congressional enforcement 
authority makes it inevitable that some level of constitutional state action 
will be deterred or affected, yet the risk that this state action will 
undermine the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
is paramount.241 
The Court’s willingness to allow Congress to regulate otherwise-
constitutional behavior and intrude on state sovereignty so as to prevent 
constitutional violations has deep roots in the case law. For example, in a 
series of decisions collectively known as the White Primary Cases, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a succession of Texas laws that prohibited 
African-American voters from participating in the Democratic Party’s 
primary despite the fact that there was no direct state action that ran 
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.242 The Court rightly recognized that 
African-Americans were being disenfranchised indirectly through the 
state apparatus because the Democratic Party effectively controlled the 
state government. Thus, in Smith v. Allwright,243 the Court held that, 
although the “privilege of membership in a party may be . . . no concern 
of a State,” when that “privilege is . . . the essential qualification for 
voting in a primary to select nominees for a general election, the State 
makes the action of the party the action of the State.”244 In other words, 
the Democratic Party could not rely on its First Amendment right of 
association in order to exclude African-Americans because the party, in 
choosing its nominees for office, was functioning as the state. The Court 
found that the anti-circumvention norm justified abrogating the First 
Amendment rights of a private association because the state was using 
the Democratic Party to circumvent the protections of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments.245 
240. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651). 
241. See id. at 177 (holding that “Congress could rationally have concluded that, because 
electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in 
voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a 
discriminatory impact” even though such changes do not violate the Constitution (footnote 
omitted)). 
242. The Court resolved the constitutionality of the all-white primary in a series of cases from 
1927 to 1953. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled in part by Allwright, 321 U.S. 649; Nixon v. 
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
243. 321 U.S. 649. 
244. Smith, 321 U.S. at 664–65; see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 
245. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the 
Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 653–54 (1998) (“Throughout the period of the White 
Primary Cases, the Democratic Party had a complete monopoly on politics in Texas. Thus, when 
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Similarly, the Court has invalidated government practices that burden 
the right to vote but without requiring discriminatory intent like that 
present in the White Primary Cases, an analytical leap justified by 
concerns that states were undermining the protections of the 
Amendments through indirect means.246 In Harper v. Virginia State 
Board of Elections,247 for example, the Court invalidated the poll tax 
because it bore no rational relationship to voter qualifications.248 
Invidiousness was premised not on the presence of racially 
discriminatory intent, but rather on the burden that the government 
regulation placed on the right to vote without adequate justification.249 
In Harper, the Fourteenth Amendment functioned as a basis for 
liability since voting is a fundamental right under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the law burdened this right, and it also supplemented the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription against racial discrimination in 
voting by focusing on one of the most obvious proxies for race: 
wealth.250 There was no evidence in the record that the poll tax had been 
passed with discriminatory intent, but arguably the law had a 
disproportionate effect on minorities in a way that offended the spirit of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.251 Despite the fact that the poll tax was a 
longstanding historical practice, the Court invalidated it because the 
country had turned a corner on civil rights with the passage of the 
Voting Rights Act and the end of public school segregation in Brown v. 
Board of Education;252 most important, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
eliminated the use of poll taxes for federal elections.253 Allowing a poll 
‘the State’ acted here, this was tantamount to the Democratic Party using state law to self-
regulate.”). 
246. But see Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001) (holding that 
evidence of discriminatory impact is insufficient to justify the ADA’s abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity). 
247. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
248. Id. at 668. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
251. Id.; cf. Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672, 676 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
New York denies equal protection by requiring voters to be literate in English). Arguably, the 
problem with the English literacy requirement is that it has a disproportionate effect on Hispanics. 
As Archibald Cox recognized, “No one could conscientiously make the a priori assertion that 
English literacy bears no rational relationship whatever to ability to vote wisely in an election in 
New York.” Archibald Cox, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human 
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 96 (1966). 
252. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
253. Cox, supra note 251, at 96 (“The evidence of original intent is flatly inconsistent with the 
theory that rich and poor must have an equal voice in elections. Originally, the ownership of 
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tax for state elections would have circumvented the protections of the 
Fifteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments, a justification that provided 
the requisite links in the chain to justify the invalidation of a 
longstanding historical practice under the Fourteenth Amendment.254 
The Voting Rights Act, in many ways, is of similar scope to the 
Enforcement Act of 1870—extending beyond discriminatory denials of 
the ballot—because of the sobering reality that the regime cannot 
function just by focusing on federal elections, or alternatively, 
discriminatory denials of the ballot.255 The Court has ignored that 
overbreadth is necessary, given that the state is responsible for enacting 
regulations that govern both state and federal elections.256 Redistricting, 
in particular, illustrates the conflation of the regulatory apparatus 
governing state and federal elections—one political party will 
gerrymander both state legislative and congressional districts in order to 
win more elections than the other party.257 What states cannot 
accomplish directly with respect to federal elections can be facilitated 
through regulations that govern state elections if the preclearance regime 
is divided.258 Given that a disproportionate amount of preclearance 
denials in recent years can be laid at the door of local governments, the 
risk of circumvention is very real in this context, justifying the 
preclearance remedy as it applies to state and local elections. 
property was regarded as a highly relevant qualification for voting as a measure of responsibility 
and material interest in government affairs. The poll tax itself was sanctioned by age, usage, and 
legal precedent.”). 
254. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), a Fifteenth Amendment case decided a few 
years earlier than Harper, the Court inferred discriminatory intent from the twenty-eight-sided 
figure that placed all African-Americans outside of the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee, 
Alabama. Id. at 341, 347. Unlike Gomillion, there was no evidence of discriminatory intent present 
in Harper, despite the racially discriminatory use of the poll tax in most southern states at the time. 
255. The Voting Rights Act requires preclearance of any change to ensure that it has not been 
used “for the purpose or with the effect” of making minorities worse off than under the prior rule. 
Like the Enforcement Act of 1870, the VRA’s focus on intent and effect is designed to capture any 
change, even the most innocuous, that could abridge the right to vote. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2006). 
256. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding the nationwide ban on literacy tests 
even though Congress relied on its original findings that the tests were being used in a 
discriminatory manner in the nine states in the deep south in extending the ban); cf. Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664–65 (1944) (recognizing the symbiotic relationship between the state 
and the Democratic Party). 
257. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 272 (2004); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313 (2006); Tolson, supra note 108, 
at 863 (arguing that states can influence federal policy through their control over congressional 
redistricting). 
258. Cf. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 257, at 2313 (noting how the American system of 
separation of powers is undermined by a similar dynamic because of political parties). 
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B. New Coverage Formula?: Discriminatory Intent and the Fallacy of 
Equal Sovereignty 
Despite Congress’s interest in preventing behavior that could 
circumvent the protections of the Amendments, it is questionable after 
Shelby County if the presence of discriminatory effect—rather than 
intent—is sufficient to justify voting rights legislation that distinguishes 
between the sovereign states.259 Indeed, one of the biggest landmines 
facing the Voting Rights Act is that it basically has functioned since 
1982 as an effects-based regime. Although section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment illustrates that the fit of voting rights legislation does not 
have to be perfect, allowing for some over- and under-inclusiveness in 
the coverage formula, application of the congruence-and-proportionality 
test or, as the Court asserts in Shelby County, the basic guiding 
principles of NAMUDNO,260 still could result in the invalidation of both 
section 5 and any newly devised formula designed to trigger coverage. 
Section 5 liability is premised on retrogression, which asks whether 
the proposed change has the purpose or effect of making minorities 
worse off than under the prior law, and a claim under section 2 of the 
VRA can be established by showing discriminatory effect as well. 
Neither requires that the state act with discriminatory purpose in order to 
face liability.261 In cases invalidating legislation that exceeded the scope 
of Congress’s authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Court has explicitly looked for a pattern of constitutional violations, 
and some indication that the statute is operating to stop those 
violations.262 Yet the fact that effect, not intent, is at the heart of the 
statute makes it unlikely that much of the conduct underlying a 
259. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (“The doctrine of the 
equality of States . . . applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted to the Union, and not 
to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”), with NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 
193, 203 (2009) (“[A] departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a 
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it 
targets.”). 
260. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622 n.1 (2013) (stating that “Northwest 
Austin guides our review under both Amendments in this case”). 
261. Discriminatory purpose is sufficient but not necessary to deny preclearance under section 5. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). 
262. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
639–40, 47 (1999) (holding that the Patent Remedy Act failed to meet the congruence-and-
proportionality test because “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the States, let 
alone a pattern of constitutional violations,” and because “it simply cannot be that ‘many of [the acts 
of patent infringement] affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of 
being unconstitutional’” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997))). 
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preclearance denial is unconstitutional. The focus on discriminatory 
effect, rather than purpose, impacts the caliber of evidence that Congress 
can amass in showing that section 5 of the VRA continues to be 
needed.263 
Notably, it is the Court that decoupled discriminatory intent from the 
retrogression analysis in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board.264 In 
Reno, the Court justified this move on the grounds that “[t]o deny 
preclearance to a plan that is not retrogressive—no matter how 
unconstitutional it may be—would risk leaving in effect a status quo that 
is even worse”; it would “blur the distinction between [section] 2 and 
[section] 5”; and most importantly, it would “exacerbate the ‘substantial’ 
federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts,” 
presumably by providing an alternative basis for preclearance denial.265 
In Shelby County, the Court pointed to Congress’s rejection of 
Bossier Parish as further evidence of section 5’s potential 
unconstitutionality;266 what the Court overlooks, however, is that the 
2006 amendments reintroduced the possibility of an intent analysis in the 
context of preclearance, implicitly helping to build a record of violations 
that would otherwise justify congressional action under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.267 Indeed, the Bossier Parish case contributed 
to the constitutional problems that surround section 5 of the VRA 
because it pushed the preclearance inquiry to focus solely on 
retrogression, which essentially requires an effects analysis,268 rather 
than discriminatory purpose. The 2006 Amendments, allowing the 
Department of Justice to deny preclearance because of either 
discriminatory intent or retrogression, actually addressed one of the core 
263. See Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal 
Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 180 (2012) (noting that the VRA is 
potentially unconstitutional because of the general “account of the Equal Protection Clause as 
merely prohibiting intentional discrimination [which] suggests that congressional authority to enact 
the Voting Rights Act is questionable, since the Act invalidates a whole host of state actions that 
would be found constitutional under the intent standard”).  
264. 528 U.S. 320 (2000). 
265. Id. at 336. 
266. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627 (2013) (stating that allowing 
preclearance denial based on discriminatory purpose would raise “the bar that covered jurisdictions 
must clear” even though “conditions . . . have dramatically improved”). 
267. Cf. Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 518 (D.D.C. 1982) (denying section 5 preclearance 
to a Georgia redistricting plan that was nonretrogressive but had a discriminatory purpose). Indeed, 
a district court recently found that the state of Texas engaged in intentional discrimination against 
minority legislators and voters during the 2010–2011 round of redistricting. Texas v. United States, 
887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 178 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2885 (2013). 
268. See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 
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criticisms of the preclearance regime—its focus on discriminatory 
effect—by tying preclearance to the constitutional standard of 
intentional discrimination. 
Nevertheless, the complexities of the VRA’s statutory scheme 
negatively affect Congress’s ability to build a record showing a pattern 
of constitutional violations; 269 instead, the record shows a series of 
regulations, mostly constitutional, that make it more difficult for 
minorities to vote or less likely that minorities can elect their candidate 
of choice.270 Using section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a baseline 
reveals that these regulations, like those that are facially discriminatory 
or passed with discriminatory intent, can lead to circumvention of the 
constitutional protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
and therefore count as abridgments of the right to vote. 
Section 2 analysis could also refute one of the key criticisms of the 
coverage formula, namely that minority voter registration and turnout in 
noncovered states parallels that in covered states, thereby undermining 
the primary justification for singling out certain jurisdictions.271 The 
statute has two provisions that address concerns about the over- and 
under-inclusiveness of the coverage and bailout procedures,272 
269. Compare Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (finding 
Indiana’s voter identification law is constitutional), with Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 144 
(D.D.C. 2012), vacated, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013) (denying preclearance to Texas’s voter 
identification law under section 5 of the VRA). 
270. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (relying on the higher 
incidence of section 2 litigation in covered versus noncovered jurisdictions, rather than incidents of 
intentional discrimination, in sustaining section 5 of the Voting Rights Act), rev’d, __U.S.__, 133 S. 
Ct. 2612 (2013). Although Congress found that the majority of DOJ objections included findings of 
discriminatory intent, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), it is not clear that 
these changes were made with discriminatory intent sufficient to violate the Constitution, see id. at 
2629 (majority opinion).  
271. The discussion of the coverage and bailout procedures here omits the potential concerns 
raised by the partisan use of section 5, but I do not think that this is undermines the constitutionality 
of the provision since partisanship does not violate the constitution in the same way that racial bias 
does. Compare Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance, 49 
HOW. L.J. 785, 830 (2006) (“[T]he argument for preclearance hinges on state and local governments 
abusing their discretion based on racial bias, while the argument against preclearance hinges on the 
federal government abusing its discretion based on partisan bias . . . the solution would seem to be 
amending the preclearance process so as to curb the risk of partisan manipulation.” (emphasis in 
original)), with Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 395 (2012) 
(exploring the constitutional implications of the fact that partisanship violates the Constitution only 
if used excessively). 
272. See Michael P. McDonald, Who’s Covered? Coverage Formula and Bailout, in THE FUTURE 
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 255, 256 (David Epstein et al. eds., 2006) (“Congress recognized that 
although many jurisdictions were appropriately covered, the coverage formula was to some extent 
arbitrary—it did not even consider the percentage of minorities within a jurisdiction—and that it 
might not cover all jurisdictions that discriminated or that it might capture jurisdictions that had not 
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provisions that the Court did not pay significant attention to in 
invalidating the coverage formula.273 First, section 4(a) of the VRA 
allows jurisdictions to obtain bailout if they have not used a test or 
device “for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color.”274 Second, section 3(c) permits 
the federal courts to require preclearance for any noncovered 
jurisdictions that violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.275 
Most covered jurisdictions have not been able to successfully bailout 
from under the statute,276 but the NAMUDNO Court addressed this 
concern to some extent by broadening the bailout provisions of the 
Act.277 In addition, section 3(c) has always been a viable solution to the 
problem of under-inclusiveness, a fact that the Court ignored in striking 
down the coverage formula, but that has gained renewed attention in 
recent months.278 
Given that the means-ends analysis of section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates a broad anti-circumvention norm, both the bail 
out provision of section 4(a) and the bail in provision of section 3(c) 
should have been a significant part of the analysis in determining “fit,” 
particularly in light of the accuracy by which the formula actually 
captures errant jurisdictions. Instead, the Court focused on the process 
discriminated.”). 
273. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628 (focusing on the government’s defense of the formula 
as “reverse-engineered” rather than the sufficiency of provisions in the statute that address the 
formula’s over and under inclusiveness). 
274. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(d) (2006). 
275. Id. § 1973a(c). 
276. McDonald, supra note 272, at 261 (noting that after the amendment to the bailout formula in 
1982, few jurisdictions have bailed out). 
277. Tolson, supra note 8, at 1213 (“The Court expanded the scope of the bailout provisions in 
order to allow NAMUDNO, which did not conduct voter registration, to bail out so as to avoid 
ruling on the constitutional questions surrounding the preclearance provisions of section 5. Yet, had 
the Court acknowledged that Congress has expansive power over elections, it would have 
recognized that the constitutional problems did not emerge from an application of section 5 to the 
utility district, but rather from the limited scope of section 4(a) in allowing the district to bail out.”); 
see also Christopher B. Seaman, An Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The 
Need for a Revised Bailout System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 46 (2010) (arguing that the 
NAMUDNO Court found that the section 4(a) bailout satisfied both Katzenbach’s “more permissive 
‘rational basis’ test” and City of Boerne’s “more stringent ‘congruence and proportionality’ 
standard”). 
278. See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, Texas v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-1303 (D.D.C. 2013), available at 
http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/241-motion-sec-3redux.pdf (motion by defendant-
interveners seeking leave to amend in order to have Texas bailed in under section 3(c) of the VRA 
because of an earlier judicial finding that the state committed intentional discrimination in crafting 
its 2011 redistricting plan). 
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by which Congress developed the formula (“reverse-engineering”) rather 
than the effectiveness of the preclearance regime itself in targeting bad 
actors, an analysis that suggests that Congress could have imposed the 
same formula that it developed in 1965 so long as the formula purposely, 
rather than coincidentally, reflects current conditions. Under a 
NAMUDNO/congruence-and-proportionality analysis, it ultimately does 
not matter, from the Court’s perspective, that the trigger of section 4(b) 
would capture the same states even if Congress had updated it in 
2006.279 Under a section 2 analysis, all of these factors—bail in, bail out, 
effectiveness and accuracy of the coverage formula—would be relevant 
in assessing how intrusive the preclearance regime is on state 
sovereignty. 
The Shelby County Court’s focus on the fact that Congress did not 
develop the coverage formula in light of current conditions, rather than 
the reality that voting discrimination still exists in the covered 
jurisdictions, is a vast departure from prior precedent that focused 
instead on reading the Act broad enough to effectuate the protections of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.280 In reality, Shelby County’s 
reliance on the principle of state equality is a concept that has very little 
legitimacy, as Congress often enacts legislation that treats states 
differently.281 Furthermore, the Constitution eschews a state-equality 
principle by virtue of the way it structures the House and the Electoral 
College, giving some states greater power on the national stage than 
others.282 Notably, the Framers initiated the penalty of section 2 with the 
279. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2650 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the legislative record shows that “the formula accurately identifies the jurisdictions 
with the worst conditions of voting discrimination”). 
280. For example, in United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S. 
110 (1978), the Court rejected the argument that political subdivisions that did not conduct 
registration for voting were not covered by section 5 because this circumvented the purpose of the 
statute. The Court reasoned that, in order for the VRA to be an effective remedial scheme that can 
address abridgments of the right to vote on the basis of race in all contexts, it is plausible to extend 
the Act’s protections to all jurisdictions within a covered state involved in electoral processes, even 
if the jurisdiction itself did not conduct registration for voting. Id. at 117–18. 
281. See Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. ONLINE 24, 27 (2013) (pointing to the Clean Air Act as an example in which, “under a rational 
basis framework, Congress might properly choose . . . to permit one state to take the lead in setting 
more stringent vehicle emissions standards, even if this choice is under-inclusive”). 
282. See Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 192 (2013) 
(noting that “the Court should find a way to reason about [Shelby County] that avoids inscribing into 
the Constitution a principle of . . . ’equal dignity’ of the states” because “the roots of such a 
principle are to be found in the losing arguments of Reconstruction’s opponents”); Price, supra note 
281, at 27 (“The text of the Constitution . . . implies the absence of a general principle of state 
equality by mandating some forms of equal treatment but not others.”). 
 
                                                     
09 - Tolson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  10:59 AM 
2014] CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND VOTING RIGHTS 437 
intent that it apply selectively, penalizing those southern states with the 
largest number of African-American voters while leaving the north 
substantially untouched.283 To say that Congress cannot pass legislation 
singling out the worst offenders, a circumstance that should justify a 
departure from this equality principle, would mean that Congress is 
constitutionally obligated to pass legislation that is overbroad so as to 
maintain this principle of state equality. Although overbreadth is 
appropriate in certain circumstances, this argument not only strains 
credulity, but also would run afoul of the Court’s own congruent-and-
proportionality standard.284 
Indeed, the most persuasive evidence justifying the coverage formula 
is the fact that, as the lower court in Shelby County pointed out, there is 
still meaningful evidence that discrimination is more widespread in 
covered jurisdictions than in noncovered ones. Both the Shelby County 
and NAMUDNO Courts focused on voter registration rates, finding that 
“the racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in the States 
originally covered by [section] 5 than it is nationwide.”285 The district 
court, in a finding supported by the court of appeals, instead pointed to 
“several significant pieces of evidence suggesting that the 21st century 
problem of voting discrimination remains more prevalent in those 
jurisdictions that have historically been subject to the preclearance 
requirement”—including the disproportionate number of successful suits 
under section 2 of the VRA in covered jurisdictions and the “continued 
prevalence of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions 
notwithstanding the considerable deterrent effect of [s]ection 5.”286 In 
283. See supra Part II. 
284. This is precisely why suggestions that preclearance be extended nationwide would only 
exacerbate, rather than fix, the constitutional issues surrounding section 5. See Fishkin, supra note 
282, at 193 (“[T]o apply an equal dignity of the states principle in Shelby County . . . would be to 
assert that the one salient difference in circumstances among the states that the Constitution requires 
Congress to ignore is the fact that certain states recently spent most of a century openly defying the 
Reconstruction Amendments . . . .” (emphasis in original)); cf. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626–27 
(chastising Congress for broadening the scope of section 5 in 2006 despite the Court’s warning that 
it could undermine the provision’s constitutionality). 
285. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2626 (comparing voter registration numbers in the six originally 
covered states in 1965 and 2004); NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203–04 (2009). 
286. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 
2612 (2013); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Uphold Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, NAT’L L.J. 
(Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202589186037&slreturn= 
20130122180432 (noting one study that “found that covered jurisdictions have only 25 percent of 
the country’s population, but account for 56 percent of the successful suits under Section 2” and 
another study, “which included published and unpublished decisions, found that 81 percent of all 
successful Section 2 cases were in the covered jurisdictions even though they only hold 25 percent 
of the nation’s population”). 
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addition, a recent study has documented that the levels of racial bloc 
voting in covered jurisdictions is not only higher than noncovered 
jurisdictions, but has increased over the past decade.287 Incorporating 
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment into the analysis, with its very 
low threshold for violations to trigger congressional enforcement efforts, 
reveals that this evidence is more than sufficient to validate Congress’s 
decision to reauthorize the VRA’s preclearance and coverage 
mechanism.288 
CONCLUSION 
Sixteen years ago, the Supreme Court pointed to the Voting Rights 
Act as the paradigmatic example of a remedial scheme appropriately 
tailored to address harmful discrimination in voting. In Shelby County v. 
Holder, the Court backtracked on this position, finding that the 
preclearance regime lacks the same constitutional foundation that existed 
when the Act was first passed in 1965. 
The Court’s decision to invalidate the coverage formula of section 
4(b) rather than the preclearance regime in its entirety leaves the door 
open for further litigation should Congress choose to pass a new 
coverage formula, or alternatively, if the Department of Justice increases 
its use of the section 3(c) bail in mechanism, which also has its own 
preclearance regime. This Article addresses these concerns by engaging 
in a structural reading of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 
premised on section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which illustrates 
that Congress has broad authority to impose the remedy of preclearance. 
This reading reveals that City of Boerne’s congruence-and-
287. Stephen Ansolebehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in 
Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 210 (2013) (arguing that “racial 
polarization is higher, on average, in the covered areas than the noncovered areas” and “the extent 
of racial polarization in presidential elections increased over the past decade” (emphasis in 
original)). 
288. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 
174, 193–94 (2007) (“To prove [section 5] was necessary, the best evidence would be data 
concerning the extent of voting rights violations in the covered jurisdictions, especially if such 
violations were more prevalent in covered than in noncovered jurisdictions. However, if the Act was 
working well, then few such examples should exist. Conversely, if widespread voting rights 
violations continued in the covered jurisdictions, then the law arguably was not working, and it 
would be difficult to justify it as a congruent and proportional remedy.”). See generally Paul Winke, 
Why the Preclearance and Bailout Provisions of the Voting Rights Act are Still a Constitutionally 
Proportional Remedy, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 69 (2003) (noting that discrimination in 
voting, and in particular the presence of racial bloc voting, make section 5 congruent and 
proportional). 
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proportionality standard as well as the “guiding principles” of 
NAMUDNO that the Court relied on in Shelby County have to be 
interpreted in light of section 2’s broad scope and extreme penalty. 
The legislative debates over section 2 illustrate Congress’s attempt to 
preserve some remnant of the pre-Civil War understanding of state 
sovereignty over elections—illustrated by the lack of a positive right of 
suffrage—while embracing increased federal power in this area during 
Reconstruction. Because of this balancing between state sovereignty and 
congressional power, section 2 represents the proper baseline from 
which to assess voting rights legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Contrary to Shelby County, the VRA’s 
preclearance regime is constitutional in its entirety because it is 
consistent with the fit of section 2; in other words, selective preclearance 
is less intrusive of state sovereignty than reducing a state’s congressional 
delegation. The imposition of lesser penalties both respects the original 
framework of section 2 while recognizing that Congress, pursuant to 
section 5, has enforcement discretion with respect to all of the provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Future litigation over the 
constitutionality of preclearance as a remedy, which is highly likely 
given all that remains unresolved following the Shelby County decision, 
has to account for section 2 and its influence on the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments in order to fully illuminate the scope of 
congressional authority over elections. 
 
 
